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COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF 
PARTIAL OWNERSHIP: FINANCIAL INTEREST 
AND CORPORATE CONTROL 
DANIEL P. O'BRIEN 
STEVEN C. SALOP* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The competitive analysis of horizontal mergers in the United States 
follows a well-established and widely accepted economic framework.' A 
merger allows previously independent competitors to coordinate their 
price and output decisions to maximize joint profits. To the extent that 
the merging firms otherwise would compete with each other and are 
not sufficiently constrained by competition from other rivals, the com-
bined firm has an incentive to raise prices and thereby reduce competi-
tion. This concern that prices may rise may be mitigated, for example, 
if rival firms are intensely competitive with the merged firm, if entry or 
expansion by small rivals in response to a price increase is easy, or if the 
merger significantly reduces costs or leads to superior products. 
Similarly, the competitive analysis of horizontal price fixing is also 
well established. If two or more competing firms coordinate their price 
or output decisions, and there are no cost savings or other benefits from 
the integration, then prices can rise and competition can be harmed. 
* Daniel P. O'Brien is Assistant Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commis-
sion. Steven C. Salop is Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center, and Senior Consultant, Charles River Associates. As members of a team of Charles 
River Associates economists, the authors consulted on behalf of the respondents in the 
Time Warner and Primestar matters discussed in this article. Professor Salop also consulted 
with the FTC staff on the draft Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice 
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (Oct. 1, 1999). Our opinions 
are entirely our own. The opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the FTC or individual Commissioners, other staff members at Charles River Associates, 
or any of the parties involved in the matters discussed in this article. We would like to 
thank Stan Besen, Christopher Bogart, RobertJoffe, Kathryn Fenton, Christopher Maxwell, 
Jane Murdoch, John Nannes, Joe Sims, John Woodbury, and Gary Zanfagna for helpful 
comments. The authors thank Michael Cowie, who contributed Part II of this article. 
I See U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,104. 
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Although the legal treatment of mergers and price fixing differs, the 
competitive analysis is motivated by the same basic economic principles. 
Nevertheless, the competitive analysis of partial ownership interests is 
less well established. A partial ownership interest could have competitive 
effects when one or more competing firms purchase some percentage 
of a rival firm's stock, or when two or more firms jointly invest in a 
venture that competes in the same market. Should these transactions 
be viewed as complete mergers? That seems wrong if the firms' managers 
retain some independence. Should they be viewed as naked price fixing? 
That seems overly simplistic because joint ventures and partial ownership 
stakes can create efficiency benefits. Should they be viewed as competi-
tively innocuous? That seems wrong because partial ownership can affect 
the incentives of the owners. 
Treatment of partial ownership interests is an important issue for 
antitrust and regulatory policy. Partial ownership interests and joint 
ventures are common and have become more important in telecommuni-
cations and high technology industries. For example, in the Time War-
ner /Turner case before the FTC in 1996, the acquired firm, Turner 
Broadcasting, controlled several cable program services (e.g., CNN, TNT, 
Cartoon Network) and was owned by several cable companies, many 
of which had ownership interests in competing program services. The 
acquiring firm, Time Warner, owned several program services (e.g., 
HBO/Cinemax) that competed for viewers and cable channel slots with 
the services owned by Turner and the cable operators. TCI, the largest 
cable operator, one of Turner's larger shareholders, and an owner of 
significant programming interests, was to receive a 9 percent share of 
Time Warner as part of the transaction.2 The FTC cleared the deal with 
a consent decree intended to prevent TCI Chairman John Malone from 
influencing Time Warner's decisions.3 
Similar issues arose in the Department of Justice'S investigation of 
Primestar's proposed acquisition of the Direct Broadcast Satellite slot 
2 This brief description does not begin to do justice to the issues surrounding the 
complex array of partial ownership interests that were important in this transaction. See 
Stan Besen et ai., Vertical and Horizontal Ownership in Cable Tv.' Time Warner-Turner (1996), 
in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 452-75 (John 
E. Kwoka,]r. & Lawrence]. White eds., 3d ed. 1999). 
3 Time Warner Inc., 61 Fed. Reg. 5,0301 (Sept. 25, 1996). The pending acquisition of 
MediaOne by AT&T raises these same issues. By its acquisition of TCI, AT&T now owns 
a part of Time Warner Entertainment. MediaOne also owns a share of Time Warner 
Entertainment. Thus, the merger would increase AT&T's share of Time Warner's cable 
systems and programming. 
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owned by News Corporation and MCI,4 the Questar proposed acquisition 
of an interest in the Kern River Pipeline, the General Motors-Toyota 
joint venture, and many other transactions.5 Similarly, the DOl has chal-
lenged a very recent deal in which Northwest Airlines purchased a 15 
percent financial interest and 51 percent of the voting interest in Conti-
nental Airlines, one of its competitors.6 The competitive effect of partial 
ownership also is an issue for the Federal Communications Commission, 
the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion.7 Most recently, the FTC and DOl have issued draft guidelines 
on competitor collaborations, which include a brief discussion of the 
financial interest and corporate control issues discussed in this article.s 
In this article, we set up an economic framework for analyzing the 
competitive effects of partial ownership interests. We have three main 
4 Primestar is a satellite television service owned by cable operators that competes with 
the cable operators, with other Direct Broadcast Satellite providers like DirecTV and Dish, 
and potentially with the new satellite service that was expected to be offered over the 
News Corporation/MCI satellite slot. The Department of Justice'S anticompetitive theory 
was that Primestar would compete less aggressively with cable than would an independent 
owner of the new satellite slot. Complaint, United Statesv. Primestar, Inc., No. 1:98CV01193 
(JLG) (D.D.C. May 12, 1998). 
5 For other investigated transactions involving partial ownership acquisitions, see infra 
note 22. Charles River Associates consulted with Primestar and Kern River Pipeline in 
those matters. Steven C. Salop consulted with Kern River in the Questar transaction and 
with Chrysler in connection with the General Motors-Toyota joint venture. For analysis 
of the General Motors-Toyota joint venture, see Timothy F. Bresnahan & Stephen C. 
Salop, Qp,antifying the Competitive Effects of Production joint Ventures, 4 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 
155 (June 1986); Janusz Ordover & Carl Shapiro, The General Motors-Toyotajoint Venture: 
An Economic Assessment, 31 WAYNE L. REv. \167 (1985); John E. Kwoka,Jr., International 
joint Venture: General Motors and Toyota, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 46 (john E. Kwoka, 
Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989). 
6 This transaction was still in litigation with the Department of Justice at the time of 
publication. An important issue, according to the complaint, is the extent to which a ten-
year voting trust might insulate Continental's managers from influence by Northwest. 
Amended Complaint, United States v. Northwest Airlines Corp., No. 98-74611 (E.D. Mich. 
Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov>. 
7 The FCC has long enforced rules governing cross-ownership within and among various 
media. For example, the rules governing Horizontal Ownership Limits in cable prevent 
any firm from having an "attributable interest" in more than 35% of the cable operators 
nationwide. An "attributable interest" is defined in the FCC's Attribution Rules as one in 
which the financial interest exceeds 5%. See In re: Implementation of Section 11 (c) of the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Horizontal Owner-
ship Limits, MM Docket No. 92-264 (F.C.C. June 26, 1998). Other regulatory agencies 
enforce similar rules. For example, the Bank Holding Company Act requires prior approval 
for any Bank Holding Company to acquire 5% or more of any bank. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1859 
(1994 & Supp. III 1997). Similarly, under the Public Utilities Regulatory Act of 1978, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission certifies small power production and co-generation 
facilities only if no more than 50% of the equity interest in the facility is held by electric 
utilities or electric utility holding companies. 16 U .S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1994). 
8 Federal Trade Commission & U.S. Department of Justice , DraftAntitrust Guidelines for 
CollaborationsAmongCompetitors§ 3.34 (Oct.l,1999) <http://www.ftc.gov> [hereinafter 
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goals. First, we conceptually derive and explain the competitive effects 
of partial ownership, explaining its key elements and drawing analogies 
to the key ideas behind the analysis of horizontal mergers. Second, we 
present a general framework for evaluating the competitive effects of 
partial ownership that is analogous to, but at the same time recognizes 
key differences in the standard analysis for evaluating horizontal mergers. 
Third, we examine several methods of quantifying these competitive 
effects. 
Intuition might suggest that partial ownership is less competitively 
problematical than a full merger because the parties can continue to 
compete with one another after the transaction. Indeed, in their treatise, 
Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner conclude that a "noncontrolling 
acquisition has no intrinsic threat to competition at all."9 
However, this intuition is not always correct. We find that partial 
investments can raise either larger or smaller concerns than complete 
mergers. This may seem surprising, since a partial acquisition would 
appear to align the parties' interests less in all cases than would a com-
plete merger. 
The competitive effects of partial ownership depend critically on two 
separate and distinct elements: financial interest and corporate control. 10 
This distinction is absent in merger analysis, which assumes that the 
acquiring firm (or person) automatically controls the acquired entity 
after the merger. With partial ownership interests, however, these ele-
ments are separable. They also can occur in ways that result in greater 
or lower harm to competition than a complete merger. 
One of the key issues in this area is whether the methodology and 
quantitative measures used in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines can be 
applied to partial ownership interests and joint ventures, or alternatively, 
whether other quantitative methods can be devised. In their treatise, 
Areeda and Turner argue that such a quantification is impossible. As 
they conclude, 
Unfortunately, there is no formula that can describe the likelihood of 
such effects .... Inappropriate, for example, would be a formula that 
Competitor Collaboration Guidelines]. See also the seminal article by Joseph F. Bradley, 
joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1521 (1982). 
95 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw ~ 1203d, at 322 (1980). 
10 That framework for analyzing the competitive effects of financial interest and corporate 
control was developed by Robert J. Reynolds & Bruce R. Snapp, The Competitive Effects of 
Partial Equity Interests and joint Ventures, 4 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 141-53 (June 1986), and 
Bresnahan & Salop, supra note 5. See also William Nye, Can ajoint Venture Lessen Competition 
More than a Merger?, 40 ECON. LETTERS 487-89 (1992). 
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attempted to discount market shares ... according to the acquirer's 
shareholding .... [T]here is no reason to suppose that the effects of 
lesser acquisitions are in any way proportional to share holdings. 1 1 
563 
This view has been challenged in the economics literature. In an 
earlier article, Timothy F. Bresnahan and Steven C. Salop developed 
modifications to the standard Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for 
analysis of some types of partial ownership acquisitions. 12 The increase 
in the HHI from a transaction is proportional to the market shares of 
the firms. This article extends the "modified" HHI to a richer set of 
corporate control scenarios and multiple, overlapping ventures. We also 
explain Carl Shapiro's diversion ratio approach and modify it slightly by 
defining the Price Pressure Index (PPI) to quantify the competitive 
effects of partial ownership interests and horizontal joint ventures. 13 
Importantly, the PPI provides a framework for evaluating partial stock 
acquisitions in markets involving differentiated products. 
We also show how partial ownership relates quantitatively to full merg-
ers. Indeed, in our framework, a full merger is a special case of a "partial" 
investment of 100 percent that gives the acquiring firm complete control. 
Partial ownership forces the analyst to grapple with the question of the 
degree of control or influence that partial owners have over managers, 
how partial ownership translates into control or influence, and how this 
influence translates into competitive effects. Thus, unlike most merger 
analysis, a central part of the analysis of partial ownership is an assessment 
of which owners have what type of control over the corporation and 
how this control translates into management decisions. 
This distinction between financial interest and corporate control 
clearly is not a new idea. Its implications for stockholder value and 
corporate law were analyzed over sixty years ago by Berle and Means in 
115 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 9, at 322 & n.18. 
12 Bresnahan & Salop, supra note 5. 
13 The diversion ratio approach is described in Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated 
Products, ANTITRUST, Spring 1996, at 23. The diversion ratio measures the amount of a 
firm's sales that are diverted to the firm's merger partner in response to a price increase, 
relative to the total substitution away from the firm. As a technical economic matter, the 
diversion ratio is the ratio of the cross-elasticity of demand to the own elasticity of demand, 
multiplied by the ratio of the quantity of the firm to that of its merger partner. See also 
Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST LJ. 363 (1998); 
Jonathan B. Baker, Product Differentiation Through Space and Time: Some Antitrust Policy Issues, 
4 ANTITRUST BULL. 177-96 (1997); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Simulation as 
an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industries, in Tm: ECONOMICS 
OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 65 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew M. Kleit eds., 1996); Robert 
Willig et aI., Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines, BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 281 (1991). As explained in more 
detail infra Part Y, the PPI is a measure for quantitying and scaling the impact of a merger 
or partial ownership acquisition on a firm's unilateral pricing incentives. 
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their path-breaking work.I4 However, Berle and Means focused on the 
implications of the separation of ownership and control on the perfor-
mance of the individual corporation. In this article, we examine its 
implications for the competitive performance of the markets in which 
firms may have partial ownership interests in their rivals. 
This article is organized as follows. In Part II, we provide a brief 
overview of the basic legal standards, which do not provide an adequate 
framework for analysis of partial stock acquisitions. In Part III, we set 
out the basic economic framework for analyzing partial ownership inter-
ests. We draw the distinction between the financial interest and corporate 
control arising from a partial ownership interest. We also examine how 
these two factors affect the competitiveness of the unilateral pricing 
incentives of the acquiring firm and the firm in which it acquires a 
partial ownership interest. In this discussion, we define and analyze a 
variety of different corporate control assumptions, such as silent financial 
interest, total control, and Coasian joint control. In Part IV, we extend 
this framework and analysis to joint ventures, distinguishing between 
horizontal and vertically integrated joint ventures. In Part V, we develop 
methods for quantifying the effect of partial ownership interests and 
joint ventures on the competitive incentives of the interested firms. 
Finally, an Appendix sets out the more technical economic analysis of 
partial ownership acquisitions. 
We believe that the framework and analysis in this article is very timely. 
The recent draft Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors draw 
the distinction between financial interest and control. 15 However, they 
do not explore the various structures examined here. Nor do they attempt 
to quantify the effects of alternative governance structures on compe-
tition. 
II. BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This Part presents a brief overview of the basic legal framework for 
antitrust evaluation of partial ownership acquisitions. In general, the 
relevant statutory language, case law, and consent orders provide only 
limited guidance in assessing the antitrust risk associated with partial 
stock acquisitions. For this reason, the basic economic framework for 
evaluating the competitive effects of partial stock acquisitions becomes 
especially importan t. 
14 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
15 Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 8, §§ 3.34(b) & 3.34(c). 
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Acquisitions of voting securities may be challenged under Section 1 
of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspir-
acies in restraint of trade.16 Unlike Section 7 of the Clayton Act, Section 
1 is not an incipiency statute prohibiting likely or probable conduct in 
the future. Accordingly, a plaintiff challenging an acquisition under 
Section 1 carries the burden of proving an actual anticompetitive effect 
through a restraint of trade, as well as concerted action. 17 While plaintiffs 
often include Section 1 claims in their complaints, there appears to be 
only one reported decision focusing on a Section 1 claim directed at 
partial acquisition of stock. IS 
Partial ownership interests have been examined more often in the 
context of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act covers the acquisition of "any part" of the 
stock of another company.19 The statute does not require acquisition of 
stock sufficient to confer control; nor does it contain a threshold or a 
minimum stock purchase amount. It simply requires acquisition of "any 
part" of a company's stock where the effect may be substantially to lessen 
competition.20 For example. acquisitions of less than 25 percent of a 
company's stock have been found to violate Section 7.21 In enforcing 
the Clayton Act more recently. the Department of Justice and the FTC 
have brought complaints and entered into consent orders limiting partial 
stock acquisitions. Several of the cases involved partial stock acquisitions 
of less than 30 percent.22 
16 15 U.S.C. § 1; see also United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 376 U.S. 665, 671-72 
(1964) ("Where, as here, merging companies are major competitive factors in a relevant 
market, the elimination of significant competition between them, by merger or consolida-
tion, itself constitutes a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. "). 
17 Texas Gulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 406--07 & n.49 (S.D. Tex. 
1973) (rejecting § 1 claim, based on lack of present anticompetitive effect, in preliminary 
injunction action brought by target of tender offer for 35% of its stock). 
18Id. 
19 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
20 Id.; see also Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 501 (1967). 
21 United States v. E.1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 602-07 (19961) 
(23% stock acquisition violates § 7); Denver & Rio Grande, 387 U.S. at 501-04 (20% stock 
acquisition warrants ICC assessment of anticompetitive effects under § 7); American Crystal 
Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524, 526, 53] (2d Cir. 1958) (23% stock 
acquisition violates § 7); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 509 F. Supp. 115, 123-25 (D. Del. 
1981) (20% stock acquisition analyzed under § 7 for horizontal and vertical effects); United 
Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 540, 552-55 (E.D. Pa. 1969) 
(21 % stock acquisition violates § 7); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. 
Supp. 307, 313, 317 (D. Conn.) (24% stock acquisition violates § 7), aJfd, 206 F.2d 738 
(2d Cir. 1953). 
22 United States v. Gillette Co., Proposed Final Judgment, Stipulation, and Competitive 
Impact Statement, 55 Fed. Reg. 12,567, 12,569 (1990) (imposing restrictions to sterilize 
acquisition of 23% non-voting shares); Medtronic, Inc., Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 
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According to the statutory language, Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
"shall not apply to persons purchasing such stock [1] solely for investment 
and [2] not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in 
attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. "23 
The courts have read this solely-for-investment exemption in two parts. 
First, the defendant must show that it made the stock acquisition solely 
for "investment," a term not defined in the statute. Second, if that 
showing has been made, the plaintiff then carries the burden of establish-
ing that the stock is being used to bring about or attempt to bring about 
a substantial lessening of competition.24 
As a matter of statutory construction, the exemption from Section 
7 turns largely on interpretation of an undefined, ambiguous term-
"investment." With this limited statutory guidance, the courts have strug-
gled to evaluate partial stock acquisitions and have not set forth any 
clear guidelines or parameters. 
Perhaps one could look for guidance in the HSR Act, which exempts 
from reporting requirements acquisitions solely for purposes of invest-
ment, when the securities acquired or held do not exceed 10 percent 
of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer.25 This is a notification 
provision and does not bear directly on substantive antitrust analysis.26 
Nevertheless, the HSR statutory exemption arguably speaks to the sub-
stantive antitrust analysis, and possibly reflects the judgment of Congress 
63 Fed. Reg. 53,919, 53,920 (1998) (restrictions imposed to make passive 10% holding 
of voting stock); United States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., Proposed Final Judgment, Stipula-
tion, and Competitive Impact Statement, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,314 (1980) (full divestiture of 
29% stock holding); United States v. AT&T Corp., Proposed FinalJudgment, Stipulation, 
and Competitive Impact Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. 2506 (1999) (full divestiture of 23.5% 
stock holding); United States v. MCI Communications. Corp., Proposed Final Judgment, 
Stipulation, and Competitive Impact Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,009 (1994) (restrictions 
imposed on 20% stock holding); Time Warner, Inc., Proposed Consent Agreement with 
Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,301, 50,308 (1996) (requiring divestiture 
of 7.5% equity position or acceptance of capped non-voting shares); Shell Oil Co., Analysis 
to Aid Public Comment, 62 Fed. Reg. 67,868, 67,871 (1997) (full divestiture of either a 
14% interest or a separate 24% stock interest); U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release, American 
Airlines Cleared to Acquire Stock in Argentine Airline (july 8, 1998) (restructuring to 
create an 8.5% passive investor). 
23 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
24 See United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 1979); 
Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The courts have 
observed that the present-tense language of the exemption ("to bring about") differs from 
the incipiency language of § 7's general prohibition ("may be substantially to lessen 
competition "), and should therefore be read to require a factual determination of whether 
the stock ownership is being used to lessen competition. Id. 
25 18 U.S.C. § 18a. 
26 The courts have not relied on this notification provision in interpreting the solely-
for-investment exemption of § 7 or otherwise in evaluating partial stock acquisitions. 
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that acquisitions of less than 10 percent of a company's stock, made for 
investment purposes, do not raise sufficient antitrust concerns to warrant 
any advance review. 
Another source for the meaning of "investment" could be an HSR 
implementing regulation providing that acquisitions are made "solely 
for purposes of investment" when the acquirer has no intention of 
participating in the formulation, determination, or direction of the basic 
business decisions of the issuer.27 The FTC's Statement of Basis and 
Purpose for this regulation identifies six types of conduct evidencing 
intent inconsistent with "solely for investment" purposes: (l) nominating 
a candidate for the board of directors of the issuer; (2) proposing 
corporate action requiring shareholder approval; (3) soliciting proxies; 
(4) having a controlling shareholder, director, officer, or employee simul-
taneously serving as an officer or director of the issuer; (5) being a 
competitor of the issuer; and (6) doing any of the foregoing with respect 
to any entity directly or indirectly controlled by the issuer.28 
While the Clayton Act applies to acquisitions of any part of the "stock" 
of another company, the HSR Act applies more narrowly to acquisitions 
of "voting securities." The Act defines voting securities as any securities 
entitling the holder to vote for the election of directors.29 This could 
reflect a view that acquisitions of non-voting stock raise less antitrust 
concern. In this regard the HSR rules indicate that an acquisition of 
stock that does not allow for voting on directors should raise less antitrust 
concern because it confers "far less significant" power. 
Thus, the HSR Act and regulations add some clarity in distinguishing 
partial ownership acquisitions that are merely passive investments from 
those that confer control over the acquired firm. But the law remains 
27 16 C.F.R. § 801(I)(i). 
28 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 33,465 (1978). 
29 18 U.S.C. § 18a. The HSR regulations exempt acquisitions of convertible voting securi-
ties, but require reporting in advance of the conversion (§§ 801.32 & 802.31). They define 
convertible voting securities to mean voting securities that do not entitle the holder to 
vote for directors (§ 801.1(£)(2)). The Statement of Basis and Purpose discusses the 
antitrust significance of convertible securities: 
From an antitrust standpoint, reporting at conversion is more useful. It is true 
that before conversion, convertible voting securities may confer upon their holder 
the power to influence, either directly or indirectly, the management of the 
issuer. But the conversion price attached to convertibles may make conversion 
economically unattractive. And the measurement of the potential voting power 
conferred by convertibles is highly speculative, since conversions by other holders 
may dilute the potential voting power of the person holding the convertibles. 
So although a substantial holding of convertible voting securities may give the 
holder some power to influence management, this power is far less significant 
than the ability actually to vote securities. 
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highly uncertain and provides very little guidance for antitrust prac-
titioners trying to assess the antitrust risk of partial stock acquisitions. 
The economic paradigm set forth below provides a more systematic, 
principled approach to evaluating partial ownership acquisitions. 
III. BASIC ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
In analyzing the competitive effects of partial ownership, it is necessary 
to distinguish between two aspects of partial ownership, financial interest 
and corporate control. Financial interest refers to the acquiring firm's 
entitlement to a share of the profits of the acquired firm. Corporate 
control refers to the acquiring firm's ability to control or influence 
the acquired firm's competitive decision making, including pricing and 
product selection as well as sale of the company's assets. These two 
factors have separate and distinct impacts on the competitive incentives 
of the acquired and the acquiring firm. Financial interest affects the 
incentives of the acquiring firm, while corporate control affects the 
incentives of the acquired firm. 
In this analysis, we focus on the firms' unilateral pricing incentives. 
That is, we assume that the firms in the market do not collude, either 
expressly or tacitly. Instead, we assume that they compete with one 
another. Each firm sets its price independently and unilaterally, that is, 
on the assumption that its pricing decision will have no effect on the 
prices charged by its competitors. For example, we assume that the firms 
do not attempt to send signals to one another through their pricing 
decisions. This assumption of unilateral pricing decisions has a long 
tradition in industrial organization economics, going back to the early 
1800s and the work of Antoine Augustin Cournot and Joseph Bertrand, 
two French economists.30 
Despite this long history in economics, the 1982 and 1984 Merger 
Guidelines were mainly premised on an assumption that firms in concen-
trated industries attempt to collude tacitly and that preventing this collu-
sion should be the primary focus of merger analysis. 31 However, unilateral 
pricing incen tives explicitly were included in the 1992 Merger Guidelines 
so ANTOINE AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCH INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF 
THE THEORY OF WEALTH (1838, Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 
1971);Joseph Louis Francois Bertrand, Theorie mathematique de la richess sociale, 67 JOURNAL 
DES SAVANTS 499 (1838). A modern translation of Bertrand's work by James W. Friedman 
appears in COURNOT, OLIGOPOLY 73 (Andrew F. Dougherty ed., 1988). 
31 Issues of unilateral pricing incentives were implicit in the leading-firm proviso in these 
Guidelines, but they were not given any independent analytic focus. 
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analysis of competItive effects.32 This now represents the pnmary 
approach to horizontal merger analysis. 33 
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FINANCIAL INTEREST 
AND CORPORATE CONTROL 
In property law, students sometimes are taught that property rights 
can be viewed as a bundle of sticks that can be divided up among multiple 
parties in various ways.34 This bundle of sticks often refers to the various 
sources of cash flows (positive and negative) flowing from real property. 
For example, these include the surface land rents, the subsurface mineral 
rights, the water that flows through the property, the financial exposure 
from pollution runoff, i~uries to people using the property, and so on. 
Rights relating to a company's cash flow can also be divided up among 
multiple participants. In analyzing the effects of the company's structure 
on competition, we can identifY two distinct rights, which we call financial 
interest and corporate control. Financial interest refers to the right to 
receive the stream of profits generated by the firm from its operations 
and investments. Corporate control refers to the right to make the 
decisions that affect the firm. 
In a sole proprietorship, a single individual has a complete financial 
interest stake. That is, the individual has the right to 100 percent of the 
profits of the firm. The same individual also has complete control over 
the company, making the decisions about what price to charge, what 
products and how much output to produce, how much to invest, and 
whether to make agreements with other firms (including any agreement 
to sell the firm). 
In other contexts, however, it is not always true that the same person 
maintains both financial interest and corporate control. For example, 
consider a partnership owned by two individuals, one with a 51 percent 
share and one with a 49 percent share. Although their claims on corpo-
32 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 2.2. For a discussion of the economics 
underlying the 1992 Guidelines, see Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Economics and 
the 1992 Merger Guidelines: A Brief Survey, 8 REv. OF INDUS. ORG. 139 (1993), reprinted in 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS: ANTITRUST POLICY AND ECONOMICS 639 (Eleanor 
J. Fox & James T. Halverson eds., 1992). 
33 Jonathan Baker, then-Director of the Bureau of Economics at the FTC, noted that 
"Unilateral theories are now by far the most common, at least in the memoranda Associate 
Director Gary Roberts and 1 have written to the Commission." Unilateral Competitive Effects 
Theories in Merger Analysis, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 21. The Spring 1997 issue of Antitrust 
contains a series of articles that provide a useful introduction to unilateral effects analysis. 
34 See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
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rate profits are nearly equal, the majority owner may have complete 
control over the corporate decision making. This may make no difference 
if the interests of the two owners are perfectly aligned. However, if the 
owners' interests are not aligned for some reason, then the majority 
owner may have the incentive to make decisions at variance with the 
preferences of the 49 percent owner, and these decisions may have an 
effect on the competitive performance of the market in which the firm 
competes. Thus, when the partnership is formed, the 49 percent partner 
may insist on certain constraints being placed on the controlling part-
ner's decisions. The majority partner also may owe a fiduciary obligation 
to the partnership that places certain constraints on its decisions. 
As a general matter, higher financial interest is accompanied by greater 
corporate control. This is certainly true in comparing individuals with 
majority and minority stakes. Where there is no majority shareholder, 
larger minority shareholders may have disproportionate control as a 
result of their superior ability to form voting coalitions that can jointly 
control the outcome.35 
Modern corporations sometimes have quite complex corporate finan-
cial and governance structures in which there is a distinction between 
voting and non-voting stock. The non-voting shares give the holder a 
share of the profits but no right to vote for the Board or participate in 
other decisions. That is, the shareholder has financial interest with no 
corporate control. This structure can lead to a situation where a share-
holder with a minority financial interest controls the firm.36 
Control by shareholders with a small financial interest sometimes arises 
because corporations issue multiple classes of stock that differ in their 
voting power. For example, Class A shares may each come with one vote, 
whereas Class B shares may come with ten votes each. Board members 
may be elected by the entire group of shareholders, by a single class, or 
35 This proposition is consistent with game theoretic analyses of voting, which suggest 
that an individual's voting power may rise disproportionately with the percentage of 
votes held by the individual. See, e.g., John F. Banzhaf III, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A 
Mathematical Analysis, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 317 (1968); Lloyd S. Shapley, A Value for n-
Person Games, ANNALS 28; see also John S. Cubbin & Dennis Leech, The Effect of Shareholding 
Dispersion on the Degree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement, 93 ECON. J. 
351 (June 1983) (arguing that a controlling shareholding is often smaller than 50%). 
Additional empirical support for this proposition can be found in Randall Morck et aI., 
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293 
(Jan./Mar. 1988) (results suggesting that effective managerial control of the firm can 
occur with an ownership interest as small as 25%). 
36 As mentioned earlier, in the Northwest/Continental deal that is currently being liti-
gated by the Department of Justice, Northwest owns a 15% financial interest. However, 
it owns 51 % of the voting shares. See Amended Complaint, supra note 6. 
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may even be designated by the owner of a particular block of stock. Of 
course, the control exerted by shareholders with the majority of voting 
power is not absolute. If it were, the minority (or non-voting) shares 
would have little value and individuals might not be willing to invest 
under such terms. 
Fiduciary obligations may also affect the relative power of minority 
shareholders. For example, corporate and securities laws place a fiduciary 
obligation on the Board of Directors. Partnerships can have similar 
constraints. This fiduciary obligation essentially amounts to a require-
ment that the Board must act in the interest of the corporation as an 
entity, not of the m.yority, controlling shareholders. This requirement 
can serve to protect the interests of the minority shareholders. Similarly, 
antitrust law can create similar constraints by prohibiting joint pricing 
agreements by shareholder firms that are horizontal competitors. 
This distinction between financial interest and corporate control is 
key to understanding the competitive effects of partial ownership 
arrangements. In simplest terms, when a firm acquires a partial financial 
interest in a rival, the acquiring firm's unilateral pricing incentives to 
compete are reduced at the margin. What about the unilateral competi-
tive incentives of the acquired firm? If the acquiring firm has no control 
or influence over the rival, acquired firm, that rival's incentives to com-
pete may be unaffected. However, if the acquiring firm also has control 
over the rival, then the rival's incentives to compete are affected. Thus, 
to understand the implications of partial ownership interests on competi-
tion, it is necessary to analyze financial interest and corporate control 
as distinct elements. 
B. THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL INTEREST ON THE INCENTIVES 
OF THE ACQUIRING FIRM 
1. Basic Analysis of Unilateral Pricing Incentives 
To explain the role of the potential separation of financial interest 
and corporate control, we begin by describing the competitive situation 
before any acquisitions have been made. We examine the decision calcu-
lus of a firm in a market with a number of competitors that each set 
price unilaterally. (We will refer to this firm as the acquiring firm because 
later on we will show the effect of an acquisition on its unilateral pricing 
incentives.) That is, as discussed earlier, we assume that firms each price 
independently, do not tacitly or expressly collude, and do not try to 
signal one another with their pricing choices or in other ways. Instead, 
we assume that each firm reckons that its own price choice will not affect 
the prices charged by its rivals. 
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Industrial organization economics generally is premised on an assump-
tion that each firm sets its price in order to maximize its profits. In a 
perfectly competitive market, this profit maximization leads to a situation 
in which the firms set prices equal to their marginal costs. However, in 
an imperfectly competitive market with a limited number of competitors 
or product differentiation, competition does not generally lead to mar-
ginal cost pricing. Instead, each firm takes into account that it has some 
(possibly limited) control over the price it charges. It realizes that it 
can charge a higher price, albeit by selling less output. This optimal 
combination of price and output is affected by the firm's cost, the number 
of competitors, the degree of product differentiation, and the prices 
charged by the other firms in the marketY 
In this type of imperfectly competitive market, a profit-maximizing 
firm must balance the benefits and costs of a price increase. The cost 
of a price increase is that it causes some sales to be lost as some customers 
substitute to products sold by other firms. This is costly to the firm 
because the profits on those sales are lost. The beneficial effect of a 
price increase is that each of the remaining sales contributes more 
profit because of the higher price. The net effect on profits of a proposed 
price increase is the sum of these two effects. The firm's profit-
maximizing price is one at which further price increases reduce the level 
of profits because the cost outweighs the benefit.38 This profit maximiz-
ing depends, of course, on the degree of competition from other firms 
and the other factors mentioned earlier. At some level, this same benefit-
cost analysis applies to monopolists. 39 
It is useful to illustrate this methodology with a numerical example. 
Suppose that a firm has constant marginal costs of $80 per unit and has 
an initial price equal to $100.40 In determining its profit-maximizing 
price, the firm must balance the costs and benefits of raising price 
37 To keep the analysis simpler, we will assume that barriers to entry prevent the entry 
of new competitors. Of course, if entry is easy and timely, mergers and partial ownership 
interests ~re not likely to have durable anticompetitive effects. 
38 This result leads to the classic "marginal revenue equals marginal cost" equation of 
profit maximization. The price increases up to the profit-maximizing level are profitable, 
that is, the benefits outweigh the costs. Further price increases above this level reduce 
profits. 
39 Indeed, this benefit-cost analysis forms the basis for the SSNIP (small but significant 
and nontransitory increase in price) test for market definition in the Merger Guidelines. In 
that case, the Guidelines call for a benefit-cost analysis by a hypothetical profit-maximizing 
monopolist that controls a group of products. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra 
note I, § 1.0. 
40 The example is expanded in Part A of the Appendix. 
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further. 41 On the cost side, any additional price increase would result in 
a certain customer loss with an associated reduction in profits equal to 
the lost $20 margin of price over costs (i.e., $100 minus $80) on each 
customer lost. It also would result in a benefit-a larger price-cost margin 
on all the customers that did not switch to rivals. In choosing its price, 
the firm would balance the benefit and cost. 
For example, suppose that at a price of $100 the acquiring firm has 
sixteen customers. If a 10 percent price increase (to $110) would cause 
the firm to lose only a single customer, the firm would lose the $20 
margin on that customer. However, it would increase its margin by $10 
(from $20 to $30) on the fifteen customers retained, for a profit increase 
on those customers of $150. Thus, the net effect of the price increase 
would be to raise its profits by $130 (i.e., $150 minus $20). As a result, 
this firm would have the incentive to raise its price.42 
Alternatively, suppose that the firm feared that a 10 percent price 
increase would cause the loss of eight customers, four to one of its 
competitors and two each to two others. This assumed customer loss 
would reduce its profits by $160 (i.e., 8 times $20). The gain from an 
increased margin on the remaining eight customers would be only $80 
(Le.,8 times $10). The net impact on the firm would be to reduce its 
profits by $80. Thus, the firm would not have the incentive to raise price 
to $110. It would earn greater profits at a price of $100. Assuming that 
it were profitable for the firm to raise price up to $100, this would be 
its profit-maximizing price.43 
2. Impact of Merger 
The firm's incentives change if it acquires full ownership of one of 
its competitors in a merger transaction, which may give the firm an 
incentive to charge a higher price. This is because some of the customers 
it would lose when it increases price are diverted to its merger partner. 
Thus, a merger allows the acquiring firm to recapture some of the profits 
that would be lost from the price increase absent the merger. Once it 
takes this customer recapture into account, it would perceive a greater 
gain from a price increase.44 
41 The finn also will evaluate the profitability of reducing price with a similar analysis. 
42 Price reductions will also be evaluated. In this example we assume that price reductions 
are not profitable. 
45 This example only considers that possibility of a $10 price increase. In a more complete 
example, as in the Appendix, larger and smaller price increases and decreases would be 
evaluated too. 
44 This is the standard economic analysis of how a merger changes unilateral pricing 
incentives. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 2.21. 
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This analysis can be illustrated by expanding the previous numerical 
example in which the premerger, profit-maximizing price was $100 and 
a price increase to $110 was unprofitable because of the loss of eight 
customers. Suppose that the firm acquires by merger the competitor 
that captures four of its customers when the acquiring firm raises price. 
If the acquiring firm raises price to $110, it would lose eight customers 
as before. However, four of those lost customers now would be diverted 
to its merger partner, in which it has acquired a 100 percent financial 
interest. Because of this financial interest, the acquiring firm would 
recapture some of the lost profits. For example, if the acquired firm 
were to charge a price of $100 and has costs of $60, the acquired firm 
would earn an additional profit of $160-that is, $40 on each of the 
four customers it gains. Once the acquiring firm takes this additional 
source of profits into account, the acquiring firm would gain the incentive 
to raise price to $110. Its profits as a producer would fall by $80, but its 
profits as an investor in the acquired firm would rise by $160. Thus, after 
the acquisition, the net effect of the price increase would be to raise its 
total profits by $80, rather than reduce its profits by $80 as before the 
acquisition. Thus, after the merger, it would earn more at the price of 
$110 than at the price of $100. 
In a merger, the acquiring firm controls the pricing and output deci-
sions of the acquired firm and also may raise the price charged by the 
acquired firm. However, a key point worth stressing here is that the 
increased unilateral incentive of the acquiring firm to raise price demon-
strated in this example does not require or assume that the acquiring 
firm controls the acquired firm. The increased unilateral pricing incen-
tive flows directly from the acquiring firm's financial interest in the 
acquired firm. If this were not a merger, but rather the acquisition of 
all of the acquired firm's profits as a passive investor, and if the acquired 
firm did not raise its price following the transaction, the acquiring firm 
still would have this incentive to raise its price. 
When the acquiring firm also obtains corporate control over the 
acquired firm, as it would in a merger, the unilateral pricing incentives 
of the acquired firm also change. This change in incentives may lead 
the acquired firm to raise its price. The effect of the merger on the 
incentives of the acquired firm is analogous to the effect on the incentives 
of the acquiring firm. That is, an increase in the acquired firm's price 
increases the sales volume and profits of the acquiring firm as some 
fraction of the customers lost by the acquired firm from the price increase 
choose to substitute to the acquiring firm. This, in turn, raises the profits 
of the acquiring firm. If the acquiring firm controls the pricing of the 
acquired firm, it takes these higher incremental profits into account in 
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setting the price of acquired firm. These incentive issues are analyzed 
in more detail infra at Part C. 
The foregoing analysis is essentially a description of the factors that 
lead to price increases when producers of differentiated products 
merge.45 In the post-merger equilibrium, both prices tend to rise because 
the merged firm internalizes the impact of the pricing decisions on the 
profits of the previously independent firms.46 
3. Impact of Partial Ownership Interests 
This incentives analysis applies directly to the case in which the acquir-
ing firm purchases less than a 100 percent financial interest in the 
acquired firm. The acquiring firm still takes the customer recapture into 
account in its decision calculus. However, if the acquiring firm has only 
a partial financial interest, it only factors that partial interest into its 
revaluation of incremental profits from a price increase. Thus, the acqui-
sition increases the acquiring firm's incentive to raise its price. However, 
the incentive of the acquired firm to increase prices is smaller than it 
would be in a full merger.47 
To illustrate the effect of a partial financial interest on the unilateral 
pricing incentives of the acquiring firm, we return to the previous exam-
ple,48 where a 10 percent price increase by the acquiring firm from $100 
to $110 causes a loss of eight units of demand, four of which are diverted 
to the acquired firm. Absent the transaction, the acquiring firm suffers 
harm of $160 from losing eight customers (i.e., a margin of $20 for each 
of the eight units lost) and a benefit of $80 (i.e., an increase in margin 
of $10 for each of the eight units retained), for a net reduction in profits 
of $80. The price increase benefits the acquired firm because it gains 
four new units of sales, leading to an increase in its profits of $160 (i.e., 
a margin of $40 for each of the four customers). Thus, absent the 
transaction, the acquiring firm does not have the incentive to raise price 
to $110. In contrast, a complete merger gives the acquiring firm the 
incentive to raise price to $110. 
45 The effect of a merger among competitors with undifferentiated products is similar, 
though the incentives are more likely to involve output reductions than price increases. 
46 This example assumes that entry, efficiencies, and other competitive factors do not 
dominate the incentive effects examined here. 
47 The impact on the acquired firm's incentives is more complicated, as we will examine 
in the next Part. Those incentives depend on the acquiring firm's degree of control. That 
could range from no control at all (silent financial interest), to partial control, to total 
control. As discussed already, a firm with a minority financial interest nonetheless can 
have total control. 
48 For further details, see Part A of the Appendix. 
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Suppose instead that the acquiring firm purchases a 25 percent owner-
ship share in the acquired firm. In making its pricing decision, it now 
would reason that the price increase would raise the profits of the 
acquired firm by $160. As a 25 percent owner, it would factor into its 
benefit calculation that it is entitled to 25 percent of these profits, that 
is, $40, at least if the profits accrue to the shareholders. Because it would 
take this $40 as an additional benefit to the price increase, it would see 
that the net effect of the price increase on its profits would be a loss of 
$40, not the loss of $80 it anticipated absent the ownership share or the 
gain of $80 it would anticipate from a full merger. 
This incremental $40 benefit would not be large enough to tip the 
profit scales positive. However, if the example were expanded to examine 
other potential price increases, a somewhat smaller price increase might 
be profitable. For example, suppose that a 2.5 percent price increase to 
$102.50 causes the acquiring firm to lose two units of demand, one of 
which is diverted to the acquired firm. In this case, before the acquisition 
of a partial ownership interest, the loss of the two customers would 
reduce the acquired firm's profits by $40, but the increased $2.50 margin 
on the remaining fourteen customers would increase its profits by $35, 
for a net loss of $5. However, if the acquiring firm has a 25 percent 
share in the acquired firm and the acquired firm gains one of the two 
customers diverted and earns a margin of $40 on the diverted customer, 
then the acquiring firm recaptures $10 (i.e., 25 percent of $40, the 
acquired firm's margin on the additional unit). Thus, the net effect on 
its profits becomes a net gain of $5 instead of a loss of $5. The conclusion 
is that a partial financial interest increases the acquiring firm's incentives 
to raise price, but not by as much as a full merger that gives the acquiring 
firm a 100 percent financial interest.49 
This unilateral incentives analysis applies to the acquiring firm. The 
impact of the acquisition on the unilateral pricing incentives of the 
acquired firm depends on how the transaction affects the governance 
of the acquired firm. This is the issue of corporate control and is the 
second element in the evaluation of the competitive effects of partial 
ownership interests. 
C. THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE CONTROL STRUCTURES ON THE 
INCENTIVES OF THE ACQUIRED FIRM 
The pricing incentives of the acquired firm will depend on the gover-
nance structure of the acquired firm, in particular, on the degree of 
49 The proportionality result-that a 25% financial interest leads to a 2.5% price increase, 
whereas a 100% financial interest of a merger leads to a 10% price increase-is an artifact 
of the example, not a general result. 
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control that the acquiring firm has over the decision making of the 
acquired firm. As discussed already, one generally assumes that the larger 
the acquiring firm's financial interest in the acquired firm, the greater 
its degree of control will be. However, this relationship is not immutable. 
The degree of control obviously also is related to the structure of the 
financial interests of the other owners. For example, a 49 percent owner 
may have no control if one other owner has 51 percent. But a 25 percent 
owner may have effective control if all the other owners have only 
1 percent each. The degree of control also is significantly affected by the 
governance structure of the acquired firm and the constraints imposed by 
corporate law in the relevant jurisdiction. Therefore, analysis of partial 
ownership transactions and joint ventures must pay close attention to 
the governance structure. 
At one extreme on the range of corporate control structures is the 
case of no control at all, or what we call silent financial interest. At the 
other extreme is total control of the acquired firm by the acquiring firm. 
In the middle are a variety of partial control scenarios. 
1. Silent Financial Interest 
A corporate control structure characterized by a silent financial interest 
is one in which the acquiring firm is entitled to a share of the acquired 
firm's profits but has no power to control or even influence the decisions 
of the acquired firm. Instead, the acquired firm acts as if it were an 
entity independent of the acquiring firm. Silent financial interest may 
arise from the issuance of non-voting stock, enumerated restraints on 
decision-making power of the acquired firm, or the acquisition of a 
financial interest too small ever to be decisive. Silent financial interest 
does not lead to any change in the incentives of the acquired firm.50 
2. Total Control 
At the other extreme is a governance structure that leads to the acquir-
ing firm having total control over the significant competitive decision 
making of the acquired firm. An acquiring firm obviously has a total 
control position in a merger. A majority stake in the acquired firm also 
could lead to total control unless it is constrained by the corporate bylaws 
(as in silent financial interest) or the general strictures of corporate law 
(as in the case of fiduciary obligation discussed later). Total control also 
can arise even where the acquiring firm has a minority financial interest. 
For example, the acquiring firm with a minority financial interest none-
50 This is the first-round effect. Once the acquired firm raises its price, the acquiring 
firm and the other firms in the market then may have an incentive to raise their prices 
in response. 
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theless may be designated as the operating partner or it may own a 
majority of the voting stock. Total control by a large minority shareholder 
also can occur when the other shareholders are very small so that they 
cannot form a coalition to block the preferred decisions of the domi-
nant shareholder. 
Total control may arise from corporate governance rules requiring 
supermajority votes for certain significant corporate actions. For exam-
ple, suppose that a firm's corporate governance rules require a superma-
jority vote of 75 percent before the company can incur any capital 
expenditures above a $10 million threshold. In these circumstances, a 
30 percent shareholder alone can block any proposal to build a new 
plant, for example, in a geographic area where that shareholder operates 
a competing business.51 
Total control also can arise sometimes even when the acquiring firm 
has a small, non-dominant financial interest and is not designated as 
the operating partner. This can occur if the acquiring firm has median 
preferences over key competitive decisions. In this situation, its vote can 
be decisive to the outcome because it can form a majority voting coalition 
to adopt its most preferred alternative. 52 
Total control sometimes leads to the largest and potentially the least 
competitive incentives and outcome of all the control scenarios. Prices 
are highest and output is lowest, if other competitive factors remain 
constant. This outcome flows from a type of free-rider problem arising 
because the acquiring firm gains a benefit from the acquired firm charg-
ing a higher price but only pays a share of the cost. A higher price for 
the acquired firm leads to more sales for the acquiring firm. Where the 
acquiring firm has a large financial interest, its incentive to raise the 
price of the acquired firm is constrained by the lost sales suffered by 
the acquired firm if the acquired firm raises its price above its indepen-
51 The European Union has considered the existence of supermajority voting rights in 
determining whether a transaction constitutes a reportable "concentration." Commission 
Notice on the Notion of a Concentration, [1994] OJ. (C 385) 5; Commission Notice on 
Calculation of Turnover, [1994] OJ. (C 385) 31. In this regard, an acquisition of a 40% 
interest may not be reportable when the acquired firm's corporate governance rules 
require basic majority votes. The existence of supermajority voting requirements, however, 
may make this partial acquisition subject to mandatory review. 
52 The median preference is in the middle, that is, where half of the owners of the 
remaining voting stock would prefer a higher outcome than the outcome preferred by 
the owner with the median preference, and the owners of the other half of the remaining 
voting stock would prefer a lower outcome. In this situation, the median shareholder can 
form a winning coalition with one or the other group to adopt its most preferred outcome. 
A unique median voter does not always exist and governance and voting rule may limit 
its power, as discussed infra Part IV.A. 
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dent, profit-maximizing level. However, if the acquiring firm's financial 
interest is small, it takes a free ride on the losses suffered by the acquired 
firm and borne mainly by others. The negative effect suffered by the 
acquired firm from the smaller profits earned off the acquired firm may 
be swamped by the positive effect of the acquired firm's higher price 
on the profits of the acquiring firm's own operation.53 Thus, the acquiring 
firm may prefer that the acquired firm charge a very high price.54 In the 
limit, if the acquiring firm holds a minuscule financial interest but has 
total control, this free-rider problem even may lead the acquiring firm 
to want to shut down the acquired firm. This is because it would gain 
the benefit of more customers diverted from the acquired firm without 
bearing a significant share of the costS.55 
Finally, total control by a firm with a small financial interest can lead 
to an outcome that is perverse to the interests of the stockholders in 
aggregate. The controlling shareholder does not in any sense represent 
the average of the owners, even if its preferences actually are similar to 
the other shareholders. For this reason, the corporation may have the 
incentive to choose a governance structure that prevents the total control 
governance outcome. 
3. Partial Control 
In the middle are a whole range of partial control scenarios. These 
involve structures in which the acquiring firm may influence the decisions 
of the acquired firm but not totally control them. In these partial control 
scenarios, the decision makers of the acquired firm take into account the 
fact that certain of its shareholders hold financial interests in competing 
firms. With partial control, the influence of each shareholder is cons-
trained by the other shareholders of the acquired firm. The influence 
of these shareholders also may be constrained by the corporate charter, 
corporate law, stock exchanges, and antitrust. Because there is no unique 
way to take these multiple and potentially conflicting interests into 
account, many outcomes are possible. We have identified a number of 
relevant scenarios regarding partial control over the acquired firm, which 
53 In carrying out this decision calculus, the acquiring firm with a 25% financial interest 
in the acquired firm would reason that it bears only 25% of the acquired firm's lost profits 
associated with its price increase. But, to the extent that the acquired firm's customers 
switch to the acquiring firm, the acquiring firm receives 100% of the profits generated 
by the new sales. This may create a large incentive to raise the acquired firm's prices. 
54 See Nye, supra note 10, at 489. 
55 This free-rider problem leads to a competitive benefit when the acquiring firm 
increases its financial ownership of the acquired firm. This reduction in the free-rider 
effect might be used to defend an increase in a partial ownership share from an anti-
trust challenge. 
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we refer to as fiduciary obligation, Coasian joint control, proportional 
control, and one-way control. There also may be other scenarios that 
may be relevant in particular cases.56 
The pricing incentives of these partial control scenarios vary along a 
continuum. The most competitive pricing incentives arise in the case of 
fiduciary obligation. These incentives replicate the incentives of silent 
financial interest in which the acquiring firm has no control at all over 
the acquired firm. The least competitive of the partial control scenarios 
is Coasian joint control, which replicates a full merger. Proportional 
control and one-way control lead to outcomes in between these two ends 
of this continuum. All of these partial control scenarios lead to more 
competitive incentives for the acquired firm than does total control. 
a. Fiduciary Obligation 
Fiduciary obligation refers to a scenario in which control by the acquir-
ing firm is constrained by legal rules that create an obligation to serve 
the interests of the minority shareholders, in particular those with no 
other holdings. These constraints can be built into the corporate charter 
or they may be required by the public stock exchange on which the 
shares trade. They also may arise from corporate law or antitrust law. 
Either way, in making decisions that affect the acquired firm, the Board 
of Directors of the acquired firm is constrained to ignore the impact of 
its actions on the acquiring firm, even if the acquiring firm has a large 
financial interest in the acquired firm. Instead, the Board must manage 
the acquired firm to act like an independent, stand-alone entity. It is for 
this reason that the acquiring firm's partial ownership may become 
effectively passive with regard to competitively sensitive issues. A partial 
ownership interest may enable the acquiring firm to appoint one or 
more directors. The acquiring firm's Board appointees can vote, but not 
in the private self-interest of the acquiring firm. Thus, the competitive 
incentives of the acquired firm are equivalent to those in the silent 
financial interest structure. 
Some might question whether these fiduciary duties provide any real 
constraint, in particular, whether they can prevent a shareholder with 
interests in competing firms from controlling or influencing the acquired 
firm to take its competitive interests into account. It can be argued that 
it would be difficult for independent shareholders to detect and prove 
such a violation of fiduciary obligation. It is one thing to show that a 
56 For example, the Banzhaf and Shapley indices of voting power, supra note 35, would 
predict intermediate outcomes that satisfy certain axioms of fairness and relative voting 
strengths. 
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firm made a sweetheart deal to lease a building from a director at an 
above-market price. It is arguably much more difficult to prove that the 
Board set a price of $110 (to divert customers at the margin to the 
competing firms owned by one or more shareholders) rather than a price 
of $100, that would maximize the stand-alone profits of the acquired firm. 
Without clear evidence, courts might defer to the business judgment of 
the Board. 
However, this strong view may ignore the role of independent, public 
directors on the Boards of public companies and the public disclosures 
that must be made under securities laws. These directors owe clear 
allegiance to the company and the independent shareholders, not the 
interests of the shareholders who own competing firms. They would 
likely vote for decisions that were in the interest of the acquired firm as 
a stand-alone entity, not in the interests of the shareholders who compete 
with the acquired firm. To side with those shareholders with competing 
interests would be a clear violation of the fiduciary duties of these direc-
tors. If the Board takes actions that favor competing companies at the 
expense of the independent shareholders, these independent directors 
might well have the incentives, expertise, and information needed to 
prove the violation of the fiduciary duties. They are also well situated to 
publicize the violation. 
It could be argued that the interested shareholders might use their 
influence to try to remove independent directors that behaved too inde-
pendently. However, this might be a risky tactic. If the interested share-
holders were to remove the independent directors for voting according 
to their fiduciary obligation, or if they blocked certain disclosures, such 
conduct could raise serious legal and regulatory issues and expose the 
Board or the interested shareholders to significant legal risk. Thus, it 
seems far from settled that one or more of the shareholders, even if 
they collectively had a majority interest, could cause a company to pursue 
a course of conduct that advances their interests while conflicting with 
the best interests of the company. In short, the degree of control under 
these circumstances remains an unsettled issue. 
b. Coasian Joint Control 
To many economists, Coasianjoint control represents the paradigma-
tic governance structure. In this structure, the managers of the acquiring 
firm try to maximize the joint profits of both the acquired firm and the 
acquiring firm. The managers of the acquired firm act similarly. In this 
way, they make the same decisions that they would if they were actually 
merged. Then, they divide up the joint profits in some agreed-upon 
manner. We refer to this as the Coasian outcome or Coasian joint control 
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because it satisfies the tenets of the Coase Theorem in the absence of 
transactions costsY It leads to competitive incentives for both the 
acquired and acquiring firm equivalent to those in a full merger. 
Like most Coasian theoretical outcomes, however, this outcome faces 
the problem of real-world transactions costs. In the partial ownership 
structure, there are two key types of transactions costs-legal constraints 
and strategic behavior. The legal constraints involve antitrust law, in 
addition to breach of fiduciary duty. If the acquiring firm has a minority 
financial interest in the acquired firm,joint profit-maximization and side 
payments between them may constitute price fixing. Such Coasian joint 
control involves two independently owned and operated firms that are 
setting price jointly and dividing up the profits. There is no integration 
of production facilities or technology. Indeed, this behavior might well 
fall under the per se rule.58 
The transactions costs based on strategic behavior are the familiar 
ones discussed in the economic theory of collusion.59 Although the two 
firms have ajoint incentive to cooperate, they have unilateral incentives 
to deviate from the cooperative outcome to maximize independent 
profits. For example, the owner of the acquiring firm would have the 
incentive to "promise" to raise its price up to the cooperative (merger-
equivalent) level, but then secretly cut prices to increase its profits at 
the expense of the acquired firm. Mter all, the owner has a 100 percent 
stake in the acquiring firm but only a partial financial interest in the 
acquired firm. The managers of the acquired firm face a similar situation. 
One of their shareholders, the owner of the acquiring firm, wants them 
to cooperate. But the other shareholders would prefer that the acquired 
firm cheat by secretly cutting prices. Thus, both types of transactions 
costs may prevent the Coasian outcome from being achieved. 
57 The Coase Theorem states that in the absence of transactions costs, parties will 
negotiate to the joint wealth-maximizing outcome, regardless of the allocation of legal 
rights. 
58 The concerted action of the acquiring and acquired firm may be outside the reach 
of the Sherman Act in the event the acquiring firm is deemed to control the acquired 
firm under the Copperweld doctrine. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 
U.S. 752, 770-71 (1984) (parent company and wholly owned subsidiary lack sufficient 
independence to conspire). District courts have extended Copperweld to situations in which 
a firm owns 51 % or more of the shares of the other and to other situations where there 
is apparent power to control. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, ANTITRUST LAw 
DEVELOPMENTS 25-28 (4th ed. 1997). In most partial ownership situations, where the 
acquiring firm holds less than 50% of the voting shares, the firms will be treated as distinct 
entities under Copperweld, and hence subject to the per se rule against price fixing by 
horizontal competitors. 
59 See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE, chs. 7-8 (3d ed. 1990); see also Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note l. 
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c. One-Way Control 
One-way control refers to a scenario in which the acquiring firm has 
enough power over the acquired firm to force the acquired firm to 
maximize joint profits and not secretly cheat. However, this joint profit-
maximization only applies to the acquired firm. The acquiring firm 
continues to act in its own self interest, making decisions that take 
into account the fact that it has only a partial ownership stake in the 
acquired firm. 
One-way control leads to more competitive incentives than does Coa-
sian joint control. This is because the controlling firm does not fully 
internalize the free-rider problem in the one-way control scenario. In 
contrast, in Coasianjoint control the effects are completely internalized. 
d. Proportional Control 
Proportional control refers to a slightly different scenario in which 
the Board and managers of the acquiring firm take into account their 
shareholders' interests in other firms. However, rather than trying to 
maximize joint profits, they take the shareholders' interests into account 
in proportion to their financial interests in the acquired firm. For exam-
ple, if the acquiring firm is the only competitor with a financial interest 
in the acquired firm and it has a 25 percent stake, then the acquired 
firm's managers will make pricing and output decisions as if the acquired 
firm has a 25 percent financial interest in the acquiring firm. Proportional 
control is more relevant in the joint venture context when the acquired 
firm is the joint venture entity and there are a number of competitors 
with financial interests in that entity. 
For the case of undifferentiated products, proportional control can 
lead to more or less competitive pricing incentives than one-way control. 
The incentives of the acquiring firm will be the same under one-way 
and proportional control. However, the acquired firm might behave 
more or less competitively under proportional control. In this context, 
both one-way and proportional control structures lead to competitive 
incentives that are in between fiduciary obligation and Coasian joint 
control. Fiduciary obligation is equivalent to silent financial interest and 
Coasian joint control is equivalent to a full merger. For the homogeneous 
product case, total control is the least competitive of all the scenarios. 
For the case of differentiated products, the analysis is more compli-
cated and the ran kings cannot be proved in general. They depend on 
the details of market structure. For example, total control can lead to 
higher or lower prices than a full merger. Full evaluation of alternative 
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corporate control structures requires the use of the quantitative method-
ologies discussed below. 
IV. APPLICATION TO JOINT VENTURES 
The analysis so far has been limited to a single partial ownership 
interest in a single acquired firm by a single acquiring firm. However, 
this economic framework can easily be extended to the case of joint 
ventures, that is, entities that are owned by and compete with a number 
of competing firms.50 
Joint ventures obviously are quite common in the modern economy. 
They range from jointly owned oil pipelines and automotive ventures to 
cable programming services and biotechnology ventures. The gover-
nance structures of these ventures involve combinations of the corporate 
control structures discussed earlier. 
Joint ventures may be horizontal, vertical, or both. A horizontal joint 
venture is a jointly owned entity whose parents compete with the venture 
and each other. A vertical joint venture is a jointly owned entity whose 
parents supply inputs to the venture, produce outputs that are comple-
mentary to the output of the venture, or produce outputs using an input 
produced by the venture. Joint ventures also can involve both vertical 
and horizontal elements. For example, a joint venture may be jointly 
owned by firms that are vertically integrated and compete with the ven-
ture and each other in at least one of the markets. 
A. HORIZONTAL JOINT VENTURES 
Horizontal joint ventures are entities whose parents compete with the 
joint venture and each other. For example, before being fully acquired 
by Time Warner, Turner Broadcasting Company was a venture owned 
partially by Time Warner and TCI. Turner owned a number of cable 
programming services (e.g., CNN, WTBS, TNT). Those services arguably 
competed with services fully or partially owned by Time Warner (e.g., 
E!, HBO, CourtTV) and TCI (e.g., Discovery Channel, Starz!, Encore). 
While the analysis of horizontal joint ventures flows directly from the 
previous analysis of partial ownership interests, it is more complicated 
because there are multiple parents with partial ownership interests and 
6() Antitrust analysis of joint ventures also involves the analysis of foreclosure and other 
potential exclusionary conduct by the joint venture and its members. See, e.g., Dennis W. 
Carlton & Steven C. Salop, Symposium: High Technology, Antitrust & The Regulation of Competi-
tion: You Keep on Knocking But You Can't Come In: Evaluating Restrictions on Access Rules to 
Input joint Ventures, 9 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 319 (1996). This analysis of exclusionary conduct, 
however, is beyond the scope of this article. 
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there is a larger set of possible governance structures. The issues sur-
rounding the total control governance structure also become more com-
plicated and more interesting in the context of joint ventures. 
The pricing incentive effects of the parents' partial financial interests 
are identical to the previous analysis. For example, consider a joint 
venture that is owned by three competitors ("parents") and competes 
with its parents and other firms in the market. Because each of these 
acquiring firms has a financial interest in the venture, each of its pricing 
incentives is compromised somewhat. Each parent realizes that a higher 
price for its product will drive some sales to the venture, and it will 
obtain a share of the higher profits earned by the venture as a result. 
The pricing incentives of the joint venture entity depend crucially on 
its governance and ownership structure. The simplest cases to analyze 
involve structures in which every parent has a silent financial interest or 
the venture's control is fully constrained by the fiduciary obligations to 
independent, minority shareholders. In these structures, the manage-
ment of the venture ignores the identity of its shareholders as competing 
firms and acts simply to maximize the profits of the venture. The parents 
may wish that the venture management would take their interests into 
account, but that does not occur. 
As discussed earlier, these two equivalent governance structures can 
arise because of constraints created by either the corporate charter, 
corporate law, or antitrust law. In a multi-parent joint venture, constraints 
could be voluntarily adopted if the parties find themselves in some type 
of governance stalemate. For example, the parents may prefer silent 
financial interest to the dysfunctional outcome of total control. This 
could lead them to cede effective control to the management of the 
venture. 
The total control structure, in principle, can arise in three ways, as 
discussed earlier. First, one of the venture's parents may be designated 
as the operating partner under the joint venture operating agreement. 
Second, one of the parents may have an unconstrained m~ority stake 
that gives it complete control. Third, the venture partners may make 
decisions by majority vote with an unconstrained agenda and one of the 
venture's parents (the "median" shareholder) may be decisive in these 
votes. This decisive shareholder may have minority financial and voting 
interests. Indeed, its financial and voting interests may be quite small.61 
61 For example, suppose that a venture has 101 shareholders, each with slightly less 
than a I % financial interest. Suppose that these shareholders differ in their interests in 
competing firms and that they differ in the price they each prefer the venture to set. To 
be concrete, suppose that shareholder I would prefer the lowest price Ph shareholder 2 
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We have already discussed how the pricing incentives of the joint 
venture (the acquired firm) under total control can be less competitive 
than even a full merger. This result comes from the free-rider effect. A 
controlling shareholder with a minority stake in the joint venture can 
gain a larger benefit from the joint venture entity charging a higher 
price than the loss it suffers from the reduced profits of the joint venture. 
The controlling shareholder in the total control structure does not take 
into account the harms suffered by the other shareholders from the 
reduced joint venture profits. Instead, it takes a free ride on these losses. 
In the total control structure, the competitive pricing incentives are 
worse when the controlling shareholder's financial interest in the venture 
is proportionately lower. This possibly counter-intuitive result arises 
because a lower financial interest increases the magnitude of the free-
rider effect. In the limiting case of a controlling shareholder with a 
minuscule financial interest in the venture, that shareholder may have 
the incentive to shut down the venture altogether. By doing so, the 
profits of the venture fall to zero, but the profits of the parents, including 
the controlling shareholder, rise because the competing output of the 
venture is eliminated. If the controlling shareholder is entitled to only 
a minuscule share of the venture's profits, it virtually ignores that source 
of wealth reduction in favor of a focus on the increased profits earned 
from its own production entity. 
This analysis of the relationship between pricing incentives and the 
financial interest of the controlling shareholder generates an interesting 
efficiency rationale for mergers between the shareholders of a joint 
venture. If the controlling shareholder in a joint venture acquires the 
interest of another shareholder, its pricing incentives become more 
competitive, not less. This defense of joint venture consolidation results 
because the magnitude of the free-rider effect falls when its financial 
interest rises. 
A merger between the controlling shareholder and a competing firm 
that also owns a stake in the joint venture involves conflicting effects on 
incentives. On the one hand, by gaining control over a competitor, the 
competitive pricing incentives of the controlling shareholder's firm are 
the second lowest price />2, and so on up to shareholder 101, who prefers the highest price 
/JIOI' That is, /JI < />2 < ... ,<PM < .... </JIOI' In this case, stockholder 51 is the median 
voter and its preferred price Pol would be adopted in an unrestricted voting agenda. Its 
preferences are decisive because its preferred price Pol would defeat any other pricing 
proposal. Yet, stockholder 51 has this power despite the fact that it has less than 1 % of 
the financial interest. If there are multiple issues or a restrained voting agenda, the analysis 
is more complicated and the results may change dramatically, as discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 64-66. 
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lessened. It now takes into account that when it raises price, sales lost 
to the newly acquired firm may be recaptured as profits arising from the 
financial interest in the acquired firm. On the other hand, by increasing 
its share of the joint venture, the controlling shareholder's pricing incen-
tives for the venture become more competitive. Which effect dominates 
is an empirical matter that depends on the margins, market shares, and 
diversion ratios of the firms. 
A perhaps even more striking implication of total control involves the 
performance of the corporation itself, rather than just competitive effects 
in the market. In particular, the decision chosen by the controlling 
shareholder with a partial financial interest does not reflect the collective 
preferences of all of the shareholders. This result occurs even when the 
controlling shareholder's preferences are the same as or are the average 
of the others. Indeed, because of the free-rider effect, a controlling 
minority shareholder in the total control structure does not make the 
same decision that it would if it were the sole owner of the venture.62 
For these reasons, a governance structure that gives total control to one 
minority shareholder is dysfunctional. This result creates a collective 
incentive for the shareholders to adopt a different governance structure. 
This dysfunctional outcome can be illustrated clearly with the following 
example. Suppose that a horizontal joint venture is formed by five com-
peting firms, called A, B, C, D, and E, each of which owns a 20 percent 
share of the venture. Suppose that each of these parent shareholders 
has identical demand and costs. As a result, each has the same individual 
preferences as to the price to be charged by the venture. In particular, 
suppose that if any of the five firms were the sole owner of the venture, 
it would choose a venture price of $100. Similarly, this is the price 
that the five shareholders would agree is the best price for all of them 
collectively. Of course, this price is higher than the price that would be 
set by an independent, stand-alone owner of the venture that did not 
compete with the venture. This is the standard economic incentive effect 
of a merger. 
Now suppose that firm C is the controlling minority shareholder. 
Because of the free-rider effect, firm C would force the joint venture to 
charge a significantly higher price, say $150. That is the same price that 
anyone of the five parents would charge if it were the controlling 
minority shareho,lder. Yet this price set by the controlling shareholder 
62 The divergence between the controlling shareholder's decision and the preferences 
of all of the stockholders is larger when the minority stake of the controlling shareholder 
is smaller. 
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does not reflect the best price from the point of view of all the sharehold-
ers collectively. 53 
This same basic result occurs when there is diversity among the underly-
ing preferences of the shareholders. For example, suppose the five par-
ents have different costs-firm A with the lowest, up to firm E with the 
highest costs. A higher cost firm would prefer that the venture charge 
a higher price than would a lower cost firm. For example, suppose that 
if firm A were the sole owner, it would have the venture price at $50, 
firm B a price of $75, firm C a price of $100, firm D a price of $125, 
and firm E a price of $150. In this example, firm C is the median 
shareholder and its preferred price is the average of the preferred prices 
of the five shareholders, viewing each as the sole owner. If the five 
parents were merged, suppose that they also would choose the average 
price of $100, the price that firm C also would charge if it were the sole 
owner. Thus, $100 is in some sense the best price for the group. In 
contrast, if firm C were the controlling shareholder with a 20 percent 
financial interest, it would set a price above $100. The median sharehold-
er's decision does not reflect the preferences of the shareholders collec-
tively. As shown in the example, this result can occur even when the 
median shareholder's preferences are also the average preferences of 
all the shareholders. The analysis here makes it clear that the price 
chosen by a median shareholder with total control also is a dysfunctional 
price from the point of view of the shareholders collectively. 
The claim that the median voter (here, shareholder) has total control 
has another flaw that has been attacked by political economists studying 
public choice. In a more complicated setting in which there are multiple 
dimensions to the voters' preferences, there generally is no unique 
median voter. As a result, there is no stable voting coalition that can 
control the outcome.54 
For example, suppose that the Board's decisions must go beyond price 
(or output). Suppose the Board also must decide what type and variety 
of products to sell, decisions that can affect competitors differently. In 
addition, suppose it also must decide how much and what type of advertis-
63 This is a standard result when there is free riding. In a standard pollution context, 
for example, every individual would choose to pollute less, if he or she were the sole 
member of society. Society can agree collectively that less pollution would be better, but 
each individual unilaterally chooses to pollute in excess of this amount. 
64 See Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some 
Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976). A useful bibliography of 
results in social choice theory is contained in David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 
Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory, 1 ANN. REv. POL. SCI. 259 
(1998). 
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ing to carry out, decisions that also affect competitors differently, and 
not in the same way as would the product selection decision. In this 
more complicated setting, in which different Board members prefer 
different combinations of choices, there generally is no way of lining 
voters up so that one voter is the median voter over all possible combina-
tions of choices. As a result, aggregate preferences will not be transitive 
and votes will cycle, never reaching a stable outcome.65 
Stability could be re-achieved in these situations by limiting the voting 
agenda in some way, either in the charter or by giving control over the 
agenda to someone. However, in this case, the median voter for any 
particular issue may no longer have complete control over the outcome. 
Instead, a degree of control is held by the individual controlling the 
agenda, who can select the agenda knowing that the median voter for 
that particular agenda will determine the outcome.66 
Another difficulty in applying voting theory to the corporate contest 
is that the identity of the median voter for any particular issue also may 
not be clear. On the one hand, the determination could be based on 
the membership of the Board. In this case, an independent, public 
director may be the median, decisive director. On the other hand, the 
determination could be based on the voting shares of the stockholders. 
The rationale for this latter approach is that the shareholders elect (and 
can replace) directors. 
B. VERTICALLY INTEGRATED JOINT VENTURES 
Some joint ventures are comprised of vertically integrated companies 
that produce complementary products as well as competing products. 
In these joint ventures, the parents compete in one or both of the 
markets in which the firms produce. When joint ventures are vertically 
as well as horizontally integrated, another competitive element is added 
to the analysis.67 The join t ven ture' s paren ts have an incentive to main tain 
low joint venture prices. By setting a low output price for the joint 
65 That is, if there are three options open to the voters, option A might defeat option 
Bmight defeat option C, but then option C might defeat option A. This failure of transitivity 
is a general result in the theory of multidimensional voting. See KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL 
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). For a discussion and legal application in 
a different area of the law, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate 
Law, 26J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983). 
66 Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, 
and the Status Quo, 33 PUBLIC CHOICE 27 (1978); Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 
Voting Models and Empirical Evidence, 72 AM. SCIENTIST 465 (1984). 
67 Vertically integrated joint ventures also raise important exclusionary conduct issues 
regarding access and exclusivity. See, e.g., Carlton & Salop, supra note 60. These exclusion 
issues are ignored in this part. 
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venture's product, the parents can sell more of the complementary 
product that they produce and thus increase their profits.68 
In a vertically integrated joint venture, the analysis of competitive 
incentives is more complicated because of the combination of the hori-
zontal and vertical elements. For example, suppose the venture is gov-
erned by the Coasianjoint control structure, where the managers of the 
venture attempt to maximize the sum of the profits of the venture and 
its parents. On the one hand, the horizontal overlap between the venture 
and its parents reduces the competitive incentives of the venture. In 
setting its output price, the venture takes into account the fact that a 
higher output price will divert sales to the firms owned by the parents, 
increasing the profits of the parents' firms. On the other hand, the 
vertical relationship between the venture and its parents enhances the 
competitive incentives of the venture. In setting its price, the venture 
also takes into account the fact that a higher output price will reduce 
demand for the inputs (or complementary products) sold by the parents, 
reducing the profits of the parents' firms. Which effect dominates 
depends on the relative margins of the various products and other 
factors. Where the vertical effect dominates, a vertically integrated joint 
venture has more competitive pricing incentives than would an indepen-
dent, stand-alone entity or ajoint venture in which the parents had silent 
financial interests. 
In a vertically integrated joint venture, total control may increase 
competitiveness of the entity's pricing incentives. This would occur when 
the controlling shareholder's vertical interests in the entity exceed its 
horizontal interests. In this case, the controlling shareholder's profits 
are increased more by having the venture set a low output price than a 
high output price. This situation would arise when its incremental profits 
from selling inputs (or complementary products) exceeds its incremental 
profits from selling outputs in competition with the venture, in response 
to a price change by the venture. 
C. ApPLICATION TO PRIMESTAR 
The Primestar direct broadcast satellite (nBS) venture is a good exam-
ple of a vertically integrated joint venture. It also provides an illustration 
of the use of this methodology in the HSR review process and the 
68 This incentive effect arises from the standard "double marginalization" benefit that 
can occur from vertical integration. See Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating 
Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST LJ. 513 (1995); David Reiffen & 
Michael Vita, Is There New Thinking on Vertical Integration? A Comment, 63 ANTITRUST LJ. 
917 (1995). 
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type of controversies it can engender. Primestar is a joint venture that 
distributes cable programming services to consumers with home satellite 
dishes that receive DBS service. The owners of Primestar include a num-
ber of major cable operators, Time Warner, TCI, MediaOne, Cox, and 
Comcast, along with GE, the owner of the satellite on which Primestar 
broadcasts its signal. Primestar is a horizontal joint venture because DBS 
service competes with cable companies to distribute cable programming. 
Primestar also involves vertical elemen ts, however. The cable operators 
that own Primestar are integrated into program services, as well as cable 
distribution. For example, Time Warner owns program services, such as 
HBO, Cinemax, CNN, and TBS. Through Liberty Media, TCI has com-
plete or partial ownership interests in program services, such as Encore 
and Discovery Channel. 
The incentives analysis discussed in this article is relevant to the Federal 
Communications Commission and Department of Justice antitrust inves-
tigation of Primestar's proposed acquisition of the high-powered DBS 
capacity from News Corporation and MCI. The Justice Department 
expressed concern that this transaction would reduce competition 
between cable and DBS.69 Primestar's economists used the quantitative 
methodology explained in the next Part of this article to demonstrate that 
the vertical effect (called the "programming effect" in the proceeding 
because it involved the sale of programming services to DBS and cable 
distributors) outweighed the horizontal effect (called the "cannibaliza-
tion effect" by DirecTV's economist, Carl Shapiro, because it involved 
the fact that DBS diverted subscribers from cable).70 The programming 
effect thus is a type of competitive or efficiency benefit from the vertical 
structure of the venture that leads to more competitive pricing incentives. 
As a result of the programming effect and Primestar's inherent cost 
advantages over a stand-alone entrant, Primestar's economists concluded 
from their analysis that even if one assumed that Primestar acted in the 
interests of its parents (i.e., even if Primestar was governed by Coasian 
joint control), Primestar's competitive incentives would not fall short of 
the competitive incentives of a hypothetical stand-alone DBS entrant.?l 
69 See Complaint, United States v. Primestar, Inc. No. 1:98CV01193 (JLG) (D.D.C. May 
12, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov>. 
70 The authors were part of the Charles River Associates group that carried out this 
economic analysis on behalf of Primestar. 
7I Steven C. Salop et aI., An Economic Analysis of Primestar's Competitive Behavior and 
Incentives (FCC Submission) (Jan. 7, 1998); Shapiro, Statement of Professor Carl Shapiro 
(FCC Submission) (Oct. 20, 1997). As part of its analysis, CRA also quantified Primestar's 
inherent cost advantages over the hypothetical stand-alone entrant. Such cost advantages 
also would intensify its incentives to reduce prices. CRA estimated the impact on incentives 
from Primestar cost advantages arising from volume discounts. See Gregory Rosston, Decla-
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In a recent article, Daniel Rubinfeld (formerly Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney General for Economics and head of the U.S. Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division's economic investigation of Primestar) reached the 
opposite conclusion.72 Professor Rubinfeld's results differ from that of 
Primestar's economists because he makes a number of different assump-
tions. This controversy among the economists illustrates the types of 
issues that become salient when the methodology discussed in this article 
is used in the HSR process. 
The main difference among the economists involves the Primestar 
economists' assumption that if Primestar reduced its price by a small 
amount, it would attract new subscribers from three sources-other 
DBS operators, cable operators, and over-the-air broadcast-in equal 
proportions. By contrast, Professor Rubinfeld observes that while DBS 
subscribers historically have come mainly from over-the-air television, 
that fact is changing as DBS matures. In the future, analysts expect 
that most DBS subscribers will switch from cable to DBS. Therefore, 
he concludes that it is appropriate to assume that most of Primestar's 
incremental subscribers in response to a price decrease also will come 
from cable. 
Primestar's economists criticized the assumption that the diversion 
ratio equals the historical fraction of DBS subscribers that previously 
took cable. Suppose it were true that every DBS subscriber previously 
had taken cable. However, that is not the appropriate data. Many of the 
additional subscribers that it would attract by its price cut would be cable 
subscribers that otherwise would have switched from cable to a different 
DBS operator (i.e., DirecTV or Echostar) if Primestar had not reduced 
its price. In calculating the diversion ratio, those incremental subscribers 
are properly viewed as coming from other DBS operators, not from 
cable. Stated another way, cable subscribers will decide to switch to DBS. 
However, which DBS service they choose will depend on the relative 
prices of the DBS competitors. 
Professor Rubinfeld also applied the median voter analysis to the 
Primestar joint venture. Using voting shares to determine the median 
shareholder, he argued that TCI would be the median shareholder and 
that TCl's incentives would tilt more towards fear of cannibalization than 
ration on Behalf of Echostar Communications (FCC Submission) (Oct. 20, 1997); Salop 
et aI., A Further Analysis of the Effects of Cable Diversion, Premium Service Buy Rates, 
and Volume Discounts on Primestar's Competitive Incentives: A Response to Dr. Rosston 
(May 19,1998); Salop et aI., A Comparison of Primes tar's Costs with Those of a Standalone 
Entrant (Mar. 31, 1998). 
72 Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Primestar Acquisition of the News Corp./MCI Direct Broadcast 
Satellite Assets, REv. INDUS. ORG. (forthcoming 2000). 
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towards a desire for greater programming profits. However, Professor 
Rubinfeld's analysis does not take into account the various criticisms of 
the median voter analysis discussed in this article. 
First, it is not clear that Professor Rubinfeld's assumption of total 
control by the median voter makes sense. If the Primestar partnership 
were to restrict its output to benefit its parents' cable operations, the 
costs and benefits would not be distributed uniformly among the parents. 
Side payments among the parents might be necessary in order to ensure 
the stability of the agreement. This analysis would suggest that the Coa-
sian joint control scenario might be more appropriate than the total 
control assumption. 
The fiduciary obligation scenario might be more likely. In fact, 
Primestar changed its corporate governance structure from a partnership 
to a corporation as part of the transaction to acquire the DBS slot. Its 
explicit rationale for this change was to eliminate the awkwardness and 
stalemates that regularly arose while it was a partnership. As a corpora-
tion, there are independent outside directors and fiduciary obligations 
that prevent vetoes by individual partners, as discussed above. Managers 
and directors would be constrained to act solely in the interest of 
Primestar, not its parents, because of fiduciary obligations arising under 
corporate and securities laws, disclosures required under the securities 
laws, and Primestar's corporate governance structure. 73 
Second, even if the median shareholder analysis were used, there is 
controversy over the identity of the controlling shareholder. Professor 
Rubinfeld's analysis is based on shareholder voting shares rather than 
decision making by the Board of Directors. However, because of the way 
in which Primestar Board membership was determined and the existence 
of public shareholders, a TCI appointee may not be the median voter 
on the Board. In contrast, Primestar's economists found that MediaOne 
would be the median Board member. 74 And, MediaOne's pricing incen-
7' TSAT and Primestar Application for Transfer of Control of TEMPO Satellite, Inc. 
(FCC Filing 91-SAT-TC-97). Rubinfeld 's analysis also bases the determination of the median 
voter solely on analysis of pricing incentives. If other important related competitive deci-
sions also were taken into account, for example, the identity and type of programming 
to carry, then the likelihood of there being a stable median shareholder with an ability 
to command a stable coalition is lessened considerably. 
74 Board seats were allocated as follows: TCI (3), Time Warner (3), MediaOne (1), Cox 
(1), Com cast (1), and public directors (2). Assuming that the public directors would vote 
in the interest of Primestar as a stand-alone entity, the resulting price rankings of these 
voters (from lowest to highest price) would be Time Warner (3), public directors (2), 
MediaOne (1), Cox (1), Com cast (I), and TCI (3). Thus, MediaOne is the median. If 
Primestar cost advantages over a stand-alone entrant are ignored, MediaOne preferences 
are slightly tilted towards fear of cannibalization. However, the preference is small (i.e., 
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tives would not be significantly inferior to those of a stand-alone owner 
of Primestar. 
V. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE INCENTIVES 
Our analysis so far has been qualitative. It has developed an economic 
framework for evaluating the effect of partial ownership interests on 
competitive incentives. In this Part, we examine possible methods of 
quantifYing these effects. 75 As discussed in the Introduction, Areeda 
and Turner were skeptical about the ability to quantifY these effects.76 
Although we do not conclude that there is a unique index, we develop 
a number of useful methods and indices similar to ones used in 
merger analysis. 
Antitrust economics has developed two technical methodologies for 
gauging quantitatively the effects of mergers on pricing and output 
incentives. One methodology, the HHI, has been used in the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines since the 1982 version. In terms of the underlying 
economics, that methodology is premised on the Cournot oligopoly 
model of quantity competition among firms producing homogeneous 
products. More recently, a new methodology has been developed based 
on work by Carl Shapiro and others that uses the diversion ratio. 77 In 
economic terms, this methodology is premised on the Bertrand model 
of price competition among firms producing differentiated products. 
In this section, we describe extensions of these methodologies for 
evaluating partial ownership acquisitions. The extension of the HHI is 
the modified HHI (or MHHI), which was developed in an earlier work.78 
This article extends the MHHI to a broader range of corporate control 
scenarios. We also develop the Price Pressure Index (or PPI), which 
extends the diversion ratio methodology for the Bertrand differentiated 
products model. 
A. THE MODIFIED HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX 
The HHI index of concentration is used in antitrust as a rough screen 
for gauging the effect of a merger on competitive incentives. Although 
far less than 5%) and even a small Primestar cost advantage would reverse the direction 
of the preference. 
75 Some of the analysis in this Part is more technical. Readers may skip the technical 
portions without a significant loss. Indeed, this part does not introduce any new arguments, 
but rather quan tifies the previous arguments. 
76 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
77 See, e.g., the articles cited supra note 13. 
78 Bresnahan & Salop, supra note 5. 
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the HHI sometimes is treated as an arbitrary measure of concentration, 
it has a theoretical underpinning in industrial organization economics. 
In the Cournot oligopoly model of quantity competition among firms 
producing homogeneous products and protected by entry barriers, the 
HHI is related to the margin between the market price and cost. 79 That 
Cournot model can be extended to take into account partial ownership 
interests under different assumptions regarding corporate control. Fol-
lowing that methodology, Bresnahan and Salop modified the HHI for 
a different set of alternative financial interest and corporate control 
scenarios.8o The revised MHHIs, summarized in Table 1 below, cover a 
broader range of scenarios.8l The MHHI can be taken as a rough gauge 
of these partial ownership scenarios on competitive incentives. 
The first column of Table 1 below gives the formulas for the MHHI 
increases. The MHHI increases (the "deltas") are caused by a partial 
ownership transaction in which firm A obtains a financial interest in 
firm B that entitles it to a fraction Beta (~) of the profits of firm Band 
the two firms have pre-acquisition market shares of Sa and Sb respectively. 
The right-hand side gives the results for an acquisition of a 20 percent 
financial interest in firm B, when firm A has a market share of 20 percent 
and firm B has a market share of 10 percent. 
Table 1 reflects the analysis discussed previously. A larger financial 
interest leads to a greater reduction in the competitive incentives of firm 
A. In addition, the effect of the transaction on the competitive incentives 
of firm B depends crucially on the structure of corporate control. The 
Full Merger: 
Silent Financial Interest: 
Total Control: 
One-way Control: 
Co asian Joint Control: 
Proportional Control: 
Table I 
Modified HHI Deltas 
General Formula 
il = 2SaSb 
il = ~ SaSb 
il = (~+ 1/~) SaSb 
il = (l + ~) SaSb 
il = 2SaSb 









79 In particular, the HHI is the share-weighted average of the price-cost margin in the 
industry multiplied by the aggregate demand elasticity in the industry. 
so Bresnahan & Salop, supra note 5. 
8l Table 1 contains a number of the scenarios derived by Bresnahan & Salop, id., and 
some additional scenarios that we have derived for this article. The formulas used to derive 
each scenario are presented in the Appendix. 
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MHHI delta is lowest for a silent financial interest because the acquisition 
has no effect on the incentives of firm E. The MHHI delta is largest for 
the case of total control, reflecting the adverse effect on incentives from 
the free-rider effect. Full merger, one way control and proportional 
control are in the middle. When firm A has a 100 percent financial 
interest in firm E (i.e., ~ = 1), all the scenarios except silent financial 
interest converge to the full merger result of d = 2SaSb• The MHHI delta 
does not converge to 2SaSb under silent financial interest because that 
scenario maintains the assumption that firm E's incentives are not 
affected even when firm A has an interest as high as 100 percent. This 
assumption, of course, is implausible in this limiting case because a firm 
with a 100 percent interest clearly would have control. 
By comparing the numbers in the example, the dramatic effect of 
alternative governance structures can be illustrated. For example, silent 
financial interest gives a delta of 40, in contrast to a full merger delta 
of 400. This indicates that a presumption that silent financial interest has 
incentive effects close to those of a merger can be extremely inaccurate. 
Indeed, even if the financial interest share was 50 percent, the MHHI 
delta would be one-quarter of the value of a full merger. The one-way 
control scenario also is significantly different from a full merger; the 
delta is only 240, only slightly more than half the increase from a merger. 
In the example, the incentive effects of total control by a minority 
shareholder are far worse than a merger. With a financial interest share 
of 20 percent, total control leads to an MHHI delta of 1040, in contrast 
to a merger delta of 400. 
We previously explained why the incentive effects of total control 
become more adverse as the financial interest share becomes lower. In 
Table 1, the smaller the financial interest in the acquired firm, the 
larger is the MHHI delta. For example, a financial interest of 20 percent 
leads to an MHHI delta of 1040. If the financial interest share instead 
were 50 percent, the MHHI delta would fall to 500.82 Finally, as the 
financial interest share (~) approaches zero, the adverse incentive effects 
become unbounded. 
The formulas for the increases in the MHHI in Table 1 can be used 
to evaluate the competitive effects of partial ownership acquisitions in 
the same way that the increases in the HHI are used in merger analysis. 
That is, the MHHI calculations provide a rough estimate of the effect 
of the change in ownership structure. Of course, MHHI calculations, 
just like conventional HHI calculations, are very rough in that they 
82 That is, 2.5 x S,Sb-
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assume a relevant market that entails no substitution to products outside 
the market, prohibitive entry barriers, no other competitive effects fac-
tors, and no efficiency benefits. However, the calculations can be useful 
as a first step, just as is the HHI in merger analysis.83 
The MHHI applies to the situation in which a single firm has a partial 
ownership interest in a single competitor. However, this methodology 
and the resulting MHHIs can be expanded for joint ventures in which 
multiple firms have partial ownership interests. In that case, there will 
be a similar component of the MHHI delta for each partial ownership 
interest, and these are aggregated to an overall delta.84 Similarly, if a 
market is structured with multiple joint ventures, either with distinct 
owners for the different ventures or with some or all of the owners having 
financial interests in multiple ventures, the MHHI also can be applied. 
In the Appendix, we derive a general formula for the MHHI that 
applies to an arbitrary array of partial ownership interests. Suppose ~ij 
is the fraction of firm j that is owned by owner i, and Yij is the weight 
that that manager of firm j places on owner i's profits in calculating the 
profits of firm j (i.e., Yij reflects the degree of control that owner i has 
over firm j). The market share of firm j is Sj We show in the Appendix 
that the MHHI can be expressed by the following equation: 
(IYij~ik) MHHI", HHI + II i SkSj' j k~j Yij~ij 
i 
(1) 
83 The change in the HHI is a rough measure of the change in competitive incentives 
flowing from a horizontal merger. Farrell and Shapiro show that the premerger HHI and 
the increase in the HHI (the "delta") calculated using premerger market shares are 
imperfect measures of the market price and output after a merger. One problem is that 
the use of premerger shares in the index likely overstates the merging firm's share in the 
event that it takes an anticompetitive action. A second problem is that there are circum-
stances in which an increase in the HHI can be associated with an increase in output. 
These imperfections, which are well known, are present in the MHHI as well as the HHI. 
SeeJoseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 AM. ECON. 
REv. 107 (1990). A useful discussion of the issues surrounding use of the HHI is also 
contained in Ordover & Shapiro, supra note 5. 
84 For example, suppose that firms A, B, and C are competitors, and that C is a jOint 
venture in which A owns 10%, B owns 20%, and public shareholders own the remainder. 
Suppose further that A's market share is 30%, B's share is 50%, and C's share is 20%. If 
the financial interests of A and B are silent, there are two MHHI delta components 
associated with the two interests. The delta associated with A's interest is t.A = 60 (= 0.1 x 
30 x 20), and the delta associated with B's financial interest is t.B = 200 (= 0.2 x 20 x 50). 
The total delta associated with the interests of firms A and B in the joint venture C (as 
compared to a situation where independent owners operated firm C) is the sum, or 260. 
The deltas for the alternative control scenarios can be computed using the formulas in 
equation 1, infra. 
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Therefore, the MHHI is the standard HHI on the assumption that all 
the firms are independent plus the various deltas (the terms under the 
summation) that arise from partial ownership interests. All the MHHI 
delta calculations in Table 1 are derived from this general expression 
under the appropriate assumptions about the amount of control con-
ferred by partial ownership. 
B. THE PRICE PRESSURE INDEX 
Antitrust economists recently have focused in more detail on analyzing 
the effects of mergers on unilateral pricing incen tives among firms selling 
differentiated products.85 These analyses are based on the Bertrand oli-
gopoly model with differentiated products. That model does not generate 
a unique, simple estimate of the change in incentives like the HHJ.86 
However, Carl Shapiro has shown how the model can be manipulated 
to get a rough estimate of the change in unilateral incentives based on 
a number of potentially measurable factors. 87 A number of alternative 
indicators of these incentive effects can be derived. We refer to these 
indicators as indices of pricing pressure, to capture the idea that they 
measure the economic pressure to change prices in response to a change 
in ownership structures. We refer to each of the resulting measures as 
a Price Pressure Index, or PPI. Alternative PPI measures for mergers 
can be derived according to the stage of the competitive adjustment 
process at which the calculation is made. In this article, we focus on the 
simplest stage, the direct incentive effects of the financial interest, hold-
ing the prices of all rival firms constant.88 
The formal derivation of the PPI deltas for each of the control scenar-
ios is contained in the Appendix below. Table 2 summarizes the results. 
The formulas for the PPI deltas are caused by a partial ownership 
transaction in which firm A obtains a financial interest in firm B that 
entitles it to a fraction Beta (~) of the profits of firm B and the fraction 
of sales lost by firm A that are diverted to firm B is denoted by 000, The 
85 See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated 
Products Industries: LogitDemand and Merger Policy, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 407 (1994); Shapiro, 
supra note 13. 
86 In fact, one of the motivations for these newer approaches is dissatisfaction with the 
HHI as an index for measuring the competitive effects of mergers between producers of 
differentiated products. 
87 Shapiro, supra note 13. 
88 This particular PPI may overstate the anticompetitive effect because it fails to account 
for the fact that demand often becomes more elastic as price increases. We have analyzed 
a PPI that takes into account the impact on demand elasticity and that is based on a 
complete adjustment to a new post-acquisition equilibrium. The overstatement also can 
be adjusted by use of an appropriate benchmark. 











Modified PPI Deltas 
MPla 
000 (P; - C;) / Ca 
~ 000 (P; - C;)/ Ca 
~ 000 (P;- C;)/Ca 
~ 000 (P;- C;)/Ca 
000 (P; - C;) / Ca 
Oab (Pa - Ca) / C; 
o 
(l/~) 0.; (Pa - Ca)/C; 
Oab (Pa - Ca)/C; 
0.; (Pa- Ca)/C; 
599 
~ 000 (P; - C;)/ Ca [~/((l - ~)2 + ~2)l Oab (Pa - Ca)/Cb 
MHHI and PPI formulas have certain similarities. In particular, if the 
two firms are symmetric, with identical prices, costs, and diversion ratios, 
then the two PPI terms can be added up. In that case, the ownership 
and control parameters (i.e., the ~- terms) enter the summed equation 
in much the same way as in the MHHI. Unlike the MHHI analysis, how-
ever, there is a separate delta for each firm, and the deltas depend on mea-
sures of the firms' margins relative to marginal cost [(Ph - Ch) / Ca and 
(Pa - Ca) / Cb respectively] and diversion ratios (Soo and Sah respectively) 
rather than market shares alone. The pressure to increase price following 
the merger depends on the reduction in the opportunity cost of raising 
price, which depends on margins and diversion ratios. The larger is firm 
B's margin (Ph - Cb) relative to firm A's marginal cost Ca, the greater is the 
profit recaptured by firm A on sales diverted to firm B, and hence the 
greater is the reduction in the opportunity cost to firm A of raising price. 
Similarly, the larger is the diversion ratio 000 from firm A to firm B, the 
greater is the profit recaptured by firm A on sales diverted to firm B, and 
the greater is the reduction in the opportunity cost to firm A of raising 
price. Thus, other things equal, the incentive for firm A to raise price after 
the merger is larger the higher is firm B's margin and the diversion ratio 
from firm A to firm B. Firm B's incentives are analyzed in a similar way. 
As with the MHHI, the PPIs can be expanded for the case of joint ven-
tures in which multiple firms have partial ownership interests and markets 
with multiple joint ventures. Suppose ~ij is the fraction of firm j that is 
owned by owner i, and Yij is the weight that that manager of firm j places 
on owner i's profits in calculating the profits of firm j. Starting from a 
position of no partial ownership interests, we show in the Appendix that 
the PPI delta for firm j can be written in general form as 
(2) flPPL = L LYij ~ik Ok Pk - C~ 
J k~jLYij~ij , Cj 
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The formulas for the PPI in Table 2 are special cases of the expression 
in equation (2). 
1. Expanding the PPI Analysis 
We discuss two ways to expand the PPI incentives analysis. First, effi-
ciency benefits created by the acquisition can be included in the index. 
Second, the index can be combined with simulation techniques to obtain 
indices that reflect market-wide pricing interactions that occur after 
the transaction. 
a. Efficiency Benefits 
Joint ventures potentially can lead to a variety of efficiency benefits.89 
These potential benefits include lower costs and superior products from 
synergies created by integrating the parents' technologies, intellectual 
property rights, and know-how. Joint ventures also can lead to elimination 
of duplicative costs and efforts and efficient risk sharing. 
One of the advantages of the PPI approach over the MHHI approach 
is its ability to incorporate efficiency benefits into the analysis in a simple 
way. It is straightforward to include cost reductions into the derivation 
of the ~PPI. If a merger, partial ownership acquisition, or joint venture 
leads to lower costs for any of the firms, the lower costs lead to more 
competitive pricing incentives, other things held constant. These incen-
tives can be added to the incentive effects from the cross-ownership 
itself. When marginal costs are decreased, they can offset some or all 
of the adverse competitive effects of the cross-ownership. If the cost 
reduction is large enough, the efficiency benefits can dominate the 
adverse incentive effects, so that the acquisition actually increases the 
competitiveness of the firm's unilateral pricing incentives. In that case, 
the net impact of the acquisition might be to reduce prices. 
The incorporation of cost reductions into the analysis is easy to see 
in equation (3). That expression shows how the change in firm A's pricing 
incentives depends on the change in its marginal costs and the incentive 
effects of its financial interests. If the transaction reduces firm A's costs, 
that component leads to an incentive for it to reduce its price.90 In terms 
89 See, e.g., Carlton & Salop, supra note 60; Carl Shapiro & Robert D. Willig, On the 
Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures, 4 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1990, at 113. 
90 The amount of the cost reduction that is passed on to purchasers depends on the 
shape of the demand CUIVe. For example, linear demand results in 50% of cost savings 
being passed on, semi-log demand of the form In(q) = a - bp results in 100% pass-through, 
and constant elasticity demand results in more than 100% pass-through. Since the shape 
of the demand CUIVe is hard to measure, the amount of pass-through can be hard to 
predict (though it can sometimes be estimated econometrically). However, the size of the 
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of the ilPPI, if marginal costs are reduced by an amount ilC, and the 
incentive effects of its financial interests are Xa, then the ilPPI reflects 
these changes as 
(3) ilPPI = ilCa + X. 
a C
a 
With this methodology, only cost reductions that affect marginal costs 
will lead to potential price decreases. To the extent that a transaction 
leads solely to reductions in fixed costs, those cost reductions will not 
affect pricing in the short run, according to standard industrial organiza-
tion methodology. They may affect prices in the long run by leading to 
entry or by deterring exit or by lowering long-run marginal costs. How-
ever, those effects do not enter this short-run pricing incentives analysis 
in the simple way set out here.91 
It is also worth noting that not all marginal cost reductions are treated 
as cognizable under the standards articulated in the efficiency section 
of the Merger Guidelines.92 In particular, cost reductions that do not 
represent real resource savings, but rather are transfers from one group 
to another, may not be counted. Tax reductions and lower input prices 
arising from increased bargaining power with suppliers are two impor-
tant examples. 
Efficiency benefits that take the form of superior product quality in 
principle can be added to the balance by estimating the cost-reduction 
equivalent (for the old product) of the quality increase. These quality 
improvements are the equivalent of marginal cost reductions because 
they affect each (marginal) unit produced. 
b. The Impact of Market-wide Pricing Interactions 
A1> we mentioned earlier, the PPI delta measures the pressure to raise 
price, holding rivals' prices constant. An alternative measure of incentives 
would examine the full equilibrium effects of changes in partial owner-
ship, allowing competitors' prices to adjust in the new equilibrium. This 
methodology involves oligopoly simulation analysis, a technique that 
anticompetitive incentive effect ~ Ob (Pb - Cb) j C, relative to the cost savings t.CjC, is likely 
to be easier to estimate. 
91 Gary L. Roberts & Steven C. Salop, Dynamic Analysis of Efficiency Benefits in Mergers, 
WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REv. 5 (1996). 
92 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 4. For a further discussion of the 
relationship between the antitrust economic welfare standard and the treatment of differ-
ent types of cost reductions, see Roberts & Salop, supra note 91. 
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recently has generated substantial research and some use in merger 
analysis at the antitrust agencies.93 
While the simulation approach provides a potentially more accurate 
measure of the ultimate price effects, the simpler PPI delta described 
here is still highly useful and may be a better tool in some cases. First, 
the PPI delta requires less information and is much simpler to calculate 
than the industry-wide, "equilibrium" price effects of an acquisition. 
Second, the PPI delta is readily interpreted as equivalent to a specific 
change in the marginal cost of each of the firms affected by a change 
in ownership structure. Third, while the PPI delta does not account 
explicitly for the price changes of all firms in the post-acquisition equilib-
rium, it provides a good measure of the size of the direct incentives of 
the firms involved in the transaction. The greater the incentive to raise 
price suggested by the PPI delta, for example, the greater the price 
increase expected from the acquisition, other things being equal. Finally, 
while the PPI delta is not perfect, it is calculated directly from the factors 
that affect pricing incentives. Thus, it will generally do a much better job 
of predicting the price effects of acquisitions in differentiated product 
settings than measures of market concentration like market shares or 
HHI (or MHHI) deltas. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this flrticle, we have described an economic framework for analyzing 
the competitive effects of partial ownership interests and joint ventures. 
We have shown that the economic effects of partial ownership have some 
similarities with the effects of complete mergers. However, an additional 
element raised by partial ownership is that financial interest can involve 
varying degrees of corporate control. We showed that financial interest 
and corporate control are separate and distinct elements in the competi-
tive effects of partial ownership. Unlike merger analysis, where the acquir-
ing firm automatically controls the acquired entity after the merger, the 
analysis of partial ownership involves a careful assessment of the degree 
of corporate control conferred by the ownership interest. 
In their treatise, Areeda and Turner conclude that, unlike a complete 
merger, a "noncontrolling acquisition has no intrinsic threat to competi-
tion at all. "94 Our analysis demonstrates that this conclusion is incorrect. 
93 Werden & Froeb, supra note 85; Shapiro, supra note 13;Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral 
Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 21; Gregory J. 
Werden, Simulating Unilateral Competitive Effects from Differentiated Products Mergers, ANTI-
TRUST, Spring 1997, at 27. 
94 See 5 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 9, at 322. 
HeinOnline -- 67 Antitrust L.J. 603 1999-2000
2000] PARTIAL OWNERSHIP 603 
We have explained how a partial financial interest changes the acquiring 
firm's incentives, even when the firm will have no control over the 
acquired firm's actions. In a horizontal acquisition, its incentives may 
change in an anticompetitive way, while in a vertical acquisition, its 
incentives may well change in a way that is beneficial. 
We have also shown that the Areeda and Turner view that "there is 
no formula that can describe the likelihood of [anticompetitive effects 
from partial ownership]" is overly pessimistic.95 We have set out quantita-
tive frameworks (the MHHI and PPI deltas) that are consistent with the 
methodology used today in merger analysis (HHIs and the diversion 
ratio approach), but general enough to account for the separate and 
distinct elements of financial interest and corporate control in partial 
ownership interests. We think that this can be a useful addition to the 
toolkit of merger and partial ownership analysis. 
95 [d. 
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APPENDIX 
A. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF THE PRICE EFFECTS OF MERGER 
AND PARTIAL OWNERSHIP 
This Appendix develops a complete numerical example to show why 
a silent partial ownership interest has a smaller effect on the price set 
by the acquiring firm than would a complete merger. In fact, for the 
special case of the linear demand, used in this example considered here, 
a partial ownership interest of x% yields a direct effect on the acquiring 
firm's price of x% of the effect caused by a complete merger. 
We assume that two firms, labeled 1 and 2, sell differentiated products 
in competition with one another. The demand for firm-I's product is 
Firm-2's demand has the same cross effect as that for firm-I, i.e., a $10 
increase in the price of good 2 increases the demand for good 1 by 4 
units (and vice versa). Prior to merging, firm-I maximizes its profits 1t1 == 
(PI - cI)DdPh P2). The first-order condition for project-maximization is 
(AI) aDI DI + (PI - CI) aP
I 
== o. 
Multiplying by PI/ DI and solving for PI yields 
(A2) 
where ell is the absolute value of the own elasticity of demand for product 
1, ell = -(aDI/aPI)PI/DI == .8PI/(56 - .8PI + AP2). Suppose that CI = 80 
and P2 == 100. Substituting these values along with the expression for ell 
into equation (A2) and solving yields a premerger price of PI = 100. 
Now suppose that firm-I merges with firm-2. The merged firm chooses 
PI to maximize the joint profits 1tMI == (PI - cI)DI (PI.P2) + (P2 - c2)D2(PI,P2)· 
The first order condition now is 
(A3) 
604 
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where m2 is the (absolute) margin P2 - C2 of firm-2. Dividing through by 
aDI/apJ, multiplying the first term by PI/PI to convert it into an elasticity, 
and solving for PI yields the post-merger price 
(A4) PI = ell 1 [CI + ~021]. 
ell -
where 021 is the diversion ratio from firm-1 to firm-2, that is, the fraction 
of sales lost by firm-1 that are captured by firm-2. Suppose that the 
diversion ratio from firm-1 to firm-2 is 50%, i.e., a 10% price increase 
causes 50% of the customers that substitute away from firm-1 to switch 
to firm-2. Assume further that P2 = 100, ~ = 100 - 60 = 40, and CI = 80. 
Substituting these values along with the expression for ell into equation 
(A4) and solving for P2 yields a postmerger price of $110. 
Alternatively, suppose that firm-1 purchases a partial ownership inter-
est of 2S% in firm-2. The profit objective of the manager of firm-1 is 
now 1tPI = (PI - cl)DI (PJ,P2) + .25(P2 - c2)D2(PJ,P2). It is straightforward 
to show that the profit-maximizing price for firm-1 in light of the partial 
ownership interest must satisfy 
(AS) P _ ell [ 2 s:] I - CI + . S ~V21 
ell - 1 
Note that equation (AS) is the same as equation (A4) except that the 
margin-diversion ratio term in brackets is multiplied by firm-1's owner-
ship share in firm-2. 
Solving equation (AS) for the optimal price under the same assump-
tions as above yields PI = 102.S. Thus, while a complete merger gives 
firm-1 an incentive to raise price by 10%, a partial ownership interest 
of 2S% gives it an incentive to raise price by only 2.S%, or one-fourth 
the incentive that exists in a complete merger. The result that an x% 
partial ownership interest yields a direct price effect of x% of the price 
effect caused by a complete merger is not general, but rather is an artifact 
of the linear demand assumption made in this example. 
B. DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLANATION OF THE PPI 
To develop the PPI, consider a market comprised of a number of 
firms selling differentiated products. To focus on situations where there 
is a potential for anticompetitive effects, suppose that further entry is 
impossible. Suppose further that the firms do not tacitly collude in their 
pricing decisions. I Instead, suppose that each firm follows the Bertrand 
1 Tacit collusion can arise when finns' pricing decisions depend on past pricing behavior 
by their rivals. For example, a firm may raise price (or refrain from lowering price) if it 
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oligopoly model and prices unilaterally, taking the prices of rivals as 
fixed and ignoring the potential effect of its pricing on the prices chosen 
by its rivals. In this scenario, the firms will reach a pricing outcome in 
which prices typically exceed the perfectly competitive level. A firm's 
price will exceed its marginal cost by an amount that depends on its 
elasticity of demand, that is, the sensitivity of its demand to the price 
it charges. 
Given this structure, suppose that the sole (i.e., 100%) owner of one 
firm (call it firm-A) acquires a partial financial interest in another firm 
(call it firm-B) that entitles it to a fraction Beta (~) of firm-B's profits. 
Mter the transaction, firm-A's owner will collect all the profits 1ta earned 
by firm-A and a fraction ~ of the profits 1tb earned by firm-B. Thus, the 
owner's total return 1t will be 
(B1) 
This financial interest will alter firm-A's unilateral pricing incentives 
in the way described previously. Assuming that the prices of firm-B 
and the other competitors are viewed by firm-A as constant at the pre-
acquisition level, firm-A will experience pressure to increase its price as 
a result of this change in incentives. The resulting pricing pressure can 
be derived and quantified by a formula that computes the effect of a 
price increase on firm-A's profits with and without the financial interest. 
Absent any ownership interest in firm-B, firm-A's profit-maximizing 
price represents a mark-up of its marginal costs, where the mark-up 
over costs depends on firm-A's elasticity of demand. We can write this 
relationship as 
(B2) 
where Ma is the mark-up factor that depends on firm-A's own-elasticity 
of demand.2 This factor is greater than one, which means that the profit-
maximizing price exceeds marginal cost. The lower is the own elasticity, 
the greater is the mark-up factor, and greater is the mark-up of price 
over marginal cost. 
fears that a lower price would cause its rivals to start a price war. Similarly, a firm may 
perceive a price increase that is retracted when it is not followed as a signal that it should 
follow the price increase to avoid a price war. In this article, we assume that the recognition 
of this type of interdependence is absent. That is, we focus on unilateral effects. 
2 Specifically where M. = ~1 where e .. is the absolute value of firm-A's own-elasticity 
eaa -
of demand, as in Equation (A2). 
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We have previously explained that when firm-A acquires a financial 
interest share ~ in firm-B, firm-A's profit-maximizing price rises to take 
account of the change in unilateral pricing incentives. In this case, the 
pricing relationship becomes: 
(B3) 
where x" measures the effect of firm-A 's cross ownership of firm-B. 
The financial interest in firm-B has the same effect on firm-A 's optimal 
price as would an increase in its costs. This result makes intuitive sense. 
The financial interest in firm-B generates an "opportunity cost" to firm-
A of increasing its output. If firm-A reduces its price to sell more of its 
product, that lower price will divert customers away from firm-B and 
reduce firm-B's profits accordingly. As a result, the owner of firm-A will 
get a smaller return on that investment in firm-B. 
The cross-ownership opportunity cost (x,,) measures the reduction in 
firm-A's profit on its investment in firm-B from increasing its sales by 
one unit. The magnitude of this cross-ownership effect is the product 
of three factors that determine the impact of a lower firm-A price on 
the returns on its investment in firm-B. These factors are firm-A's share 
of firm-B's profits (~), the margin of price over cost earned by firm-B 
on each unit sold (Pb - Cb), and the fraction of extra firm-A sales that 
are diverted to firm-B (000), that is, the diversion ratio.3 The diversion ratio 
measures the degree to which firm-B's product is a close substitute for 
firm-A's product.4 The expression for the cross-ownership opportunity 
cost x" is given as follows: 
(B4) 
We can use this cross-ownership opportunity cost to quantify the 
increased pricing pressure on firm-A's price induced by the financial 
interest. Assuming that firm-B and the other competitors do not change 
their prices, the percentage increase in firm-A's profit-maximizing price 
can be approximated from these equations. We call this approximate 
percentage price increase the PPI delta. 
Using equation (B4), we have 
!1PPI = x" = r:l.o Pb - Cb 
a C 1-'00 C 
a a 
(B5) 
3 Shapiro, supra note 13. 
4 Formally, the diversion ratio is the ratio of the cross-elasticity of demand for firm-8's 
product when firm-A raises price relative to the own-elasticity of demand for firm-A's 
product times the ratio of the quantity of firm-8 relative to the quantity of firm-A. 
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In principle, the tlPPla can be measured from data collected during the 
investigation of a merger, partial ownership acquisition, or joint venture. 
For example, prices and estimates of marginal costs might be estimated 
by using the firms' profit and loss statements, and diversion ratios might 
be estimated from econometric demand analysis, customer switching 
studies, and second-choice surveys. 
The impact of the transaction on firm-B's pricing incentives and the 
corresponding PPlb delta can be derived in a similar fashion. 5 As discussed 
earlier, firm-B's unilateral pricing incentives depend on the corporate 
control scenario. For example, if firm-A has no control over firm-B, 
either because it obtains a silent financial interest or because of fiduciary 
obligations, then there is no effect on firm-B's unilateral pricing incen-
tives. In this scenario, the PPlb delta would equal zero. 
In contrast, if firm-A has total control over firm-B, then it will have 
firm-B choose a price that maximizes firm-A's total returns, as given in 
equation (2). In this case, after the transaction, firm-Bwill choose a price 
Pb that reflects the interest of this controlling shareholder.6 The resulting 
tlPPlb for this case is 
(B6) 
C. THE MODIFIED HHI AND PRICE PRESSURE INDICES 
This Part of the Appendix provides additional details on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the MHHIs and PPIs and how they are calculated. For 
each index we present the economic model that allows one to measure 
the competitive effects of partial ownership under a variety of assump-
tions about the degree of influence owners have over the management 
of firms in which they have an interest. We first provide the notation 
used in the model; we then derive the general formulas for the two 
indices that are used to generate the formulas for the MHHI and PPI 
deltas and provide a further explanation for the indices. 
5 In this case, firm-B's pricing incentives and !:J.PPlb are derived under the assumption 
that firm-A and the other competitors do not alter their prices as a result of the acquisition. 
Of course, that assumption is false, which is part of why the !:J.PPls measure pricing pressure 
rather than the actual price effects that will flow from the acquisition. However, as discussed 
later, the pricing assumption can be relaxed and the !:J.PPI's then can be combined to 
predict the resulting equilibrium price effects. Alternatively, the !:J.PPls can be compared 
to a benchmark. 
6 The assumption that the acquiring and acquired firms behave unilaterally becomes 
less plausible when the acquiring firm has substantial or total control. In this case the PPI 
delta may understate the pressure to increase price because it ignores the additional effects 
that may arise from collusion between the two firms. 
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l. Notation 
We will use the following notation: 
Nfirms (j= 1, ... , N) 
M owners (i = 1, ... , M) 
Xj: output of firm-j 
X = 2.jx: industry output (summations are taken over all possible values 
of the index whenever the domain of the index is omitted) 
Sj = x/X: firm-j's market share 
C;(.\j): cost of output level Xj 
P(X): inverse demand for X (Cournot model, MHHJ) 
Di(PI> ... , PN): demand for product i (Bertrand model, PPJ) 
1tj = P(X)Xj - C(Xj): profits in Cournot model 
1tj = ~Dj(PI> ... , PN)-y(Dih ... , PN)): profits in Bertrand model 
~ij: ownership share of firm-j owned by owner-i 
Yij: measure of owner-i's degree of control over firm-j 
11: aggregate own-price elasticity of demand (absolute value) 
1ti = 2.j ~ij 1ti: owner-i's profit 
fIj = 2.i Yij 1ti: total profits maximized by the manager of firm-j 
609 
In a standard oligopoly model with no partial-ownership interests, the 
owners of the firm typically agree on the strategy that the manager of 
the firm should pursue-maximize the profits of the firm. Barring any 
market imperfections that preclude efficient contracting between the 
owners and the manager, the owners will give the manager the incentive 
to maximize the profits of the firm. 
When multiple owners have partial-ownership interests, however, they 
may not agree on the best course of action for the firm. For example, 
an owner of firm-A who also has a large financial interest in a rival firm-
B typically wants firm-A to pursue a less aggressive strategy than the 
strategy desired by an owner with no financial interest in firm-B. In this 
situation, where the owners have conflicting views on the best strategy 
to pursue, the question arises as to how the objective of the manager 
is determined. Ultimately, the answer turns on the corporate-control 
structure of the firm, which determines each shareholder's influence 
over decision-making within the firm. 
A parsimonious way to model shareholder influence is to assume that 
the manager of the firm maximizes a weighted sum of the shareholder's 
returns. This formulation includes a wide variety of plausible assumptions 
about the amount of influence each owner has over the manager of the 
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firm. Under this formulation, a higher weight on the profit of a particular 
owner is associated with a greater degree of influence by that owner 
over the manager. Different control scenarios then correspond to differ-
ent sets of "control weights" for the different owners. 
2. MHHI 
The MHHI, like the HHI, assumes that firms are Cournot competitors. 
Using the notation introduced above, the manager of firm-j solves 
max ~ = max LYij1ti = max LYijL~ik1tk = max LyjjL~ik[P(X)Xk - Ck(Xk)] 
Xj Xj i Xj i k Xj i k 
The first-order condition for an interior solution is 
Multiplying through by XIX and liP, this condition can be rewritten as 
( P'X) Xk P- Cj (x) ~ yij~~ik P X + ~ Yij~ij P = 0, 
which, after rearranging sums, becomes 
P C' () 1 LYij~ik 
- jXj "'i 
= - L... -=--- Sk 
P 11 k LYij~ij . 
I 
Multiplying both sides by Sj and summing over all j yields 
P- Cj(x} _! (~Yij~ik). 
LSj P - L L L SkS] . ] 11 k] Yij~ij 
i 
(Cl) 
In the standard Cournot model with n~artial ownership, the brack-
eted term in (Cl) would equal HHI = 2.. /j. Thus, the HHI can be 
] 
thought of as a measure of concentration constructed to be proportional 
to the share-weighted sum of the margins of all firms under Cournot 
competition. Using the same rule to construct a concentration index 
for the case of partial ownership, the MHHI is the bracketed term in (C1): 
( LYij~ik) MHHI = LL ± SkSj. 
k j Yij~ij 
j 
(C2) 
By separating outthe terms for which k= j, expression (2) can be written as 
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(C3) 
Thus, the MHHI is equal to the HHI plus a set of terms reflecting the 
competitive effects of cross-ownership within the industry. Starting from 
a position of zero partial ownership interests, the MHHI delta for a 
particular new ownership structure can be measured by the summation 
term in (C3). 
3. PPI 
The PPI similarly can be derived from the basic profit maximization 
calculus. The manager of firm-j solves 
n = max '" Y/Tti = max '" Yi'" Aik1tk = max '" Yi'" ~ik[PJ)k - Ck(Dk)]. } Pj ~ g P" ~ ~p I' ~ ~
i 1 i k 1 i k 
The first order condition for an interior solution is 
Solving for lj gives 
(C4) 
where and Okj= -('(wk/alj) / (aD/alj) is the diversion ratio from product-
j to product-k. Multiplying the second term on the right-hand side of 
(C4) by lj/ lj to put the expression into elasticity form, and then solving 
for lj gives 
(C5) 
where ~ = ('1/ (ejj - 1)) is the standard mark-up factor for firm-j, with 
'1j = -(aD/alj) (lj/ D) being the absolute value of firm-fs own-elasticity 
of demand. Starting from a position of no partial financial interests, the 
ratio of the summation terms in (C5) relative to the marginal cost is the 
PPI delta. 
4. Interpretation of the MHHIs and PPIs 
Starting from a position of zero cross-ownership, the MHHI delta can 
be rewritten from (C3) as: 
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where HHIAFJh = L ,Yij ~ih measures the "across-firms" concentration aris-
, 
ing from owners that have financial interests in firm-k and influence 
over the manager of firm-j, and HHlWFj = LYij ~ik measures the ''within-
, 
firm" concentration of the joint ownership and control of firm-k. Simi-
larly, starting from a position of no cross-ownership, the PPI delta for 
firmj can be written from (C5) as 
_ ~ (HHIAFJh) (Ph - C;)Okj 
d PP~ - £.. HHIWF. C' 
hj ) } 
These expressions for the MHHI and PPI deltas depend in a similar 
way on the ratios of the within-firm and across-firms concentration of 
ownership and control. There are two main differences between the 
measures. First, the MHHI delta is based on shares, whereas the PPI 
delta depends on margins and diversion ratios. Second, the MHHI delta 
is measured across all firms in equilibrium, whereas a different PPI delta 
applies to each differentiated producer. 
All else equal, the greater is the across-firms concentration from joint 
ownership of firm-k and control of firm-j, the greater is the weight 
placed on the cross-product of the shares of firms-j and k in the MHHI 
calculation and on the product of firm-k's margin and the diversion 
ratio from j to k in the PPI calculation. This makes intuitive sense; 
additional joint ownership and control, as measured by the across-firms 
HHIAWij concentration measure, causes managers to internalize more 
of the adverse effects on cross-owned firms of an expansion in their 
output. On the other hand, the greater is the within-firm concentration 
of the ownership and control of firm-j, the smaller is the effect of an 
increase in concentration arising through the joint control of firm-j and 
ownership of firm-k. Intuitively, if the within-firm ownership and control 
of firm-j is already highly concentrated, then additional control exercised 
over firm-j by owners of firm-k has little additional influence over firm-
j 's managemen t. 
An example can clarify these intuitive arguments concerning the role 
of across-firms and within-firm concentration in determining the MHHI. 
Suppose that there are two firms, 1 and 2. Initially, firm-l is wholly owned 
and controlled by owner-A, and firm-2 is wholly owned and controlled 
by owner-B. Suppose that owner-A buys an ex share of firm-2. If the 
investment is a silent financial interest, the across-firms concentration 
factors are given by 
HeinOnline -- 67 Antitrust L.J. 613 1999-2000
2000] PARTIAL OWNERSHIP 
HHIAF12 ::: YA1~A2 + YB1~B2 = (1) (a) + (0) (1 - a) = a, 
HHIAF21 = YA2~Al + YB2~Bl = (0) (1) + (1) (0) = 0, 
and the within-firm concentration factors are 
HHIWFI = YA1~Al + YB1~Bl = (1) (1) + (0) (0) = 1, 
HHIWF2=YA2~A2+YB2~B2= (O)(a) + (1)(1-a) = (I-a). 
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The total weight applied to the cross-product S1S2 in the MHHI calcula-
tion is 
HHIAFI2 HHIAF21 a 0 
HHIWFI + HHIWF2 = T + 1 - a ::: a. 
Thus, the change in the MHHI when the owner of firm-l (owner-A) 
takes a silent financial interest in firm-2 is aSIS2' This adjustment factor 
reflects the idea that, after the acquisition, the manager of firm-l will 
take into account the effects of its output decision on the profits of firm-
2 because the owner of firm-l (owner-A) will have a partial interest in 
firm-2. This is the expression used to calculate incentive effects for a 
silent partial investment in the main body of the article. 
Instead of a silent financial interest, suppose that owner-A exercises 
proportional control over the management of firm-2. In this case: 
and 
HHIAFI2 = YAI~A2+ YBI~B2 = (l)(a) + (0)(1 - a) = a 
HHIAF21 = YA2~AI + YB2~BI = (a)(l) + (1) (0) = a 
HHIWFI = YAI~AI + YB1~BI = (1)(1) + (0)(0) = 1 
HHIWF2 = YA2~A2 + YB2~B2 = a 2 + (l - a) (1 - a), 
HHIAFI2 + HHIAF21 = ~ + a = 2a{ 1 - a(1 - a) } 
HHIWFI HHIWF2 1 a 2 + (1 - a)2 1 - 2a(1 - a) . 
Thus, the increase in the MHHI from a partial investment a that 
confers proportional control is 
11 MHHI = 2a 1 - a(1 - a) 5152' 1 - 2a(1 - a) 
This is the expression used to calculate the incentive effects of propor-
tional control. 
The formulas for the other control scenarios discussed in the article 
for this example can be derived in an analogous way. The full merger 
case arises when ~AI = ~A2 = 1 and YAI = YA2 = 1. The total control case 
arises when ~AI = 1, ~A2 = a, and YAI = YA2 = 1. One-way control, where 
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the acquiring firm influences the management of the acquired firm to 
maximize joint profits but acts independently with respect to its own 
pricing decision, occurs when ~AI = 1, ~A2 = <X and "(AI = 1, "(A2 = .5. Coasian 
joint control is the same as a full merger. Proportional control occurs 
when ~AI = "(AI = 1 and ~A2 = "(A2 = <X. 
